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Introduction
This paper analyzes the pattern and costs of extracting oil from the
Iranian "Consortium" fields. Prior to 1973, the Iranian Oil Operating Com-
panies consisted of British Petroleum (40%), Shell (14%), Mobil, Exxon,
Texaco, Gulf, and SoCal (each with 7%), Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles (6%),
and Iricon (5%)1. From 1973 to the present, the Iranian government through
its National Iranian Oil Company has contracted with the Oil Service Company
of Iran (OSCO) to produce oil. OSCO is a private company; its equity is
held by the former Consortium companies.
All OSCO fields are located on land in the southwestern portion of the
country. To date all wells are flowing by natural lift, although artificial
lift by means of gas and water injection is under consideration for most of
the major fields. At least twenty fields are currently producing, with
1974 average well productivity more than twenty thousand barrels daily
(20 TBD)2. Output from all Consortium fields for the year 1974 amounted
to 5577 TBD3.
We have examined a series of Look-Ahead and Capital Development Plans
issued by both the Consortium and by OSCO during the period 1964 to 1973.
The last plan surveys the future course of oil operations through 1978.
The Iricon interest is held by American Independent, Atlantic Richfield,
Continental, Getty, Charter, and Sohio.
2The similar figure for Aramco is just over 12.5 TBD per well.
3That figure is for the complete year; in the tables of Chapter I, however,
all data are first half-year figures since individual field data is reported
in the Oil and Gas Journal on only a first half-year basis.
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In the chapters which follow, we examine current and expected poten-
tial and costs of the major producing fields, capacity maintenance, rig-
day drilling costs, capital costs on a per-daily-barrel basis, and questions
of excess capacity and future growth. The Appendix contains two short
essays on capital costs and new field development.
r, 
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I. Comparative Oil Field Analysis
We wish to consider capacity, potential output and capital costs by
field in the former Consortium fields, comparing actual figures mainly
with those of the most recent forecasts made in 1971, 1972, and 1973.
The 1973 forecast covers 1974-1978, where expectations for 1974 are firm
(* 10%), those for 1975 and 1976 are preliminary ( 15%), and those for
1977 and 1978 are tentative ( 25%). In all cases, "addendum" budget items
are NOT built into the output and capacity figures to 1978, nor is there
any adjustment for inflation or discounting.
All calculations on planned developmental well completions have been
derived from planned string day drilling expenditures by field as a per-
centage of total OSCO planned string day developmental drilling expen-
ditures. Capital coefficients are calculated using drilling and production
facilities expenditures only, excluding, for example, main oil lines (MOL's)
and gathering lines. Any capital coefficient so derived is a very low
minimum.
The fields of primary importance for examination are Agha Jari,
Ahwaz, Bibi Hakimeh, Gachsaran, Paris, Marun, Karanj, and Rag-e-Safid.*
For all but Karanj and Rag-e-Safid, actual output for 1974 fell below the
forecast 1974 rate.
*Except for Karanj and Rag-e-Safid, these fields are cited as the subject
of gas injection studies (Haft Kel as well) in the Oil and Gas Journal of
December 16, 1974, p. 21.
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Area
Pro. Wells Planned
Completions
218*
256*
282* (85)
389 107
513 124
577 64
645 68
*actual data-lst half-year
Output (TBD)
4732*
5332*
5655*
4918
5584
5995
6672
7375
8117
8122
AC (TBD)1
gross repl.
660
1085
1330 441
1549 692
1530 509
751 616
906 738
TBD/W t/B/D
(DD)
20.1*
20.8*
20.1*
17.2
14.4
14.1
12.6
24.9
18.8
72.0
33.5
20.7
The figures above are derived from the last three capital development
forecasts. The starred data are from the OGJ first-half year figures; TDB/W
represents average well productivity in those years. The output figures
appearing without stars are taken from the forecasts for the years in ques-
tion, and are used with the forecast number of producing wells to find average
well output in the future. Developmental drilling expenditures (DD) have
been derived from the drilling program forecast presented in the 1973 OSCO
forecast.
Actual output from all OSCO fields fell short of the planned levels
of output in each of the first three years, but the 1973 forecast is opti-
1The C gross figures, and the 4/B/D amounts come from the development
drilling program in the forecast of 9/1973, and are substantiated by
OSCt's timotos of gross new well capacity. Replacement capacity
is from Figure 30 of the 1973 document dealing with production and
replacement capacity.
OSCO
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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mistic about reaching and maintaining the rate of 8 mbd. The stated capacity
goals are 5800 TBD in 1974, 6500 TBD in 1975, 7100 TBD in 1976, and 8000 TBD
in both 1977 and 1978. Much of the additions to output are expected to
come from gas and water fluid injection projects, and from the development
of heretofore unexploited fields. Decline rates facing the consortium area
fields are far higher than had earlier been thought: certain selected
fields for the year 1973 give a decline rate of 6.3%, yet OSCO's own projec-
tion made in fall 1973 suggests a decline rate of 17.8% annually through
1978 if no remedial work occurs, a rate of 9.4% annually through 1978
through stimulation, workovers, and desalination, and a rate of 7.96% if well-
head separators, loops, and boosters are installed in addition. In fact,
output from existing wells was expected to fall by more than 50% from
beginning to end of the whole five year period were no maintenance program
undertaken nor new well facilities installed. The net expansion in capa-
city was to be achieved by extensive drilling of replacement and new develop-
ment wells.
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I. Agha Jari (Depth = 6,500 ft.; API = 33.90)
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) C(TBD) TBD/well +/B/D
Completions (gross=repl) (DD)
1972 45* 959* 1036 21.3*
1973 50* 1015* 1052 20.3*
1974 50* (12) 1010* 1045 177 20.2* 19
1975 66 16 1045 222 15.8 27
1976 76 10 967 114 12.7 5
1977 83 7 862 62 10.4 11
1978 90 7 762 54 8.5 3
a = 7.9%
* actual data
All the capital development plans show Agha Jari peaking at 1045 TBD
in 1975. Output declines thereafter to 762 in 1978, according to the most
recent forecast, generating an expected decline rate of 7.9%. We have
estimated the 1973 decline rate, however, as 13.7%.2 The 1969 forecasts
had shown Agha Jari output down to 622 TBD in 1978 and 444 TBD in 1980.
Note that all the change in capacity is for replacement purposes only.
We may splice the number of producing wells in 1972-1974 together
with the number of planned developmental well completions through 1978, as
indicated above. We have ignored the 12 wells planned to be completed
during 1974 since the OGJ gives 50 producing wells (first half) for both
2Allourdecline rate calculations are derived from (q/R)(1.67) for 1973,
where reserves by field (1/1/74) may be found in the International Petroleum
Encyclopedia, 1974.
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1973 and 1974. We add the 16 wells planned to be completed during 1975
directly to the OGJ figure of 50 and proceed accordingly by year through
1978. Clearly, well-productivity will not hold steady at the recent rate
of 20 TBD.
The September, 1973 forecast has Agha Jari slated for a gas lift trans-
mission center and one crude oil desalination plant in 1974. We may figure
the 1974 cost of the 177 TBD replacement capacity at 17.5 per bd. The
gas lift transmission center is firm; as an addendum in the 1974 budget,
however, 10.34 million is carried for a gas lift compression system. Two
additional crude oil desalination plants are planned in the 1975 budqet
to generate replacement capacity of 222 TBO at. 623 per bd. Here we have
our first indication of rising marginal cost in this field, as the produc-
tion facilities' cost alone is slated to rise by close to 30% durina the
course of one year. If we add on the developmental drillinq costs for
1974 and 1975 (from the table) to each of the above figures, we find that
the total capital coefficient for replacement capacity in 1975 is 650 per
bd, slightly more than a 30% increase over the comparable figure of 36.5
per bd for 1974.
We have estimated that each desalination plant throughout the OSCO
area represents an average increment of 55 TBD. We have not, however, used
that output figure in the calculations above, but rather simDly the replace-
ment capacity figures that the plan gives. What we can conclude, however,
is that of the 222 TBD replaced in 1975, for example, 110 TBD are reqained
through the installation of the two desalination plants in that year.
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After the 1975 budget year, the budgets do not mention Aqha Jari
specifically in the production facilities plans. In the 1975 addendum bud-
get, however, 7.4 million is carried for fluid injection facilities, but
with no indication of the amount of additional gross capacity to result.
History of Agha Jari
The earliest development plan we have (1964), covering the period
1965-1969, stated that the field had a capacity of 1000 TBD, revised up-
ward to only 1045 TBD in the 1971 and 1972 plans. The maximum allowable
rate of production (MAR) was given in both 1964 and 1965 as 850 TBD. The
1964 plan reported that studies were then in progress to analyze the
economics of plans to maintain Aha Jari at that rate, or to develop
replacement sources of crude. At that time, there was no idle crude cap-
acity in the Aqha Jar area; any additional crude capacity would have re-
quired drilling more wells and the construction of production units and
another main oil line (MOL). This plan specifically states that a
reduction in capacity of Agha Jari in 1968 or 1969 might be more attractive
than the expenditure that would be required to maintain capacity. After
1970, output was expected to fall due to declining well head pressures
which reduce separator capacities.
The 1965 plan reported that 850 TBD could be sustained until 1974
or 1975 prior to decline, and that no further development of export capacity
from Agha Jari was planned. Planned capacity for 1969 was 960 TBD and
809 TBD for 1970. The 1965 report also indicated that replacement well
drilling would be deferred by test development of Karanj (discovered in
1963) and of Marun (discovered in 1964), with expected savinqs in the costs
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of capacity maintenance.3 This decision was in keeping with the goal of
pursuing the most economical buildup of facilities, where the desire was
always to "defer any major capital expenditures as long as possible," and
Marun and Karanj were considered low-cost alternatives.
Clearly, recent output has exceeded the MAR of earlier years. The
company appears to be ready to maintain Agha Jari, if it carries out its
plans for continuous gas lift, and moves ahead with fluid injection. Note
that the 1978 output figure of 762 TBD would have to be multiplied by a
factor of 1.33 to generate output of 1013 TBD per day (equivalent to 1974
output).
3Already in 1965 the need had been recognized for replacement of wells qoinq
to gas, although the replacement of capacity need not necessarily come from
within Agha Jari itself. Replacement drilling was later scheduled for 1971 and
following years, as were gas-exclusion workovers.
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II. Ahwaz-Asmari (Depth = 9,000 ft.; API =
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD)
Completions
32.2°)
AC(TBD)
(gross) (repl)
(22*)* (281)* 409
37* 817* 701
40* (12) 873* 908
48 8 1124
52 4 1207
57 5 1207
65 8 1207
actual data; 1972 data in parentheses
together.
318
162
92 =
108 :
162 =
for both
29
72
92
108
162
Ahwaz-A
(12.8)*
22.1*
21.8*
23.4
23.2
21.2
18.6
and Ahwaz-B
The 1969 development plans had shown Ahwaz-Asmari peaking at 987 TBD
in 1967 and maintaining that level of production through 1980. What is
clear from looking at both the actual and the forecast data for the years
1972 and 1973 s that 1973 was a year of substantial addition to Ahwaz-
Asmari capacity, with the plans calling for a 70% increase in 1973, and
actual output going up by almost 200%.4 The forecast of 1973 calls for
substantial additions to gross capacity, although all changes in capacity
for the last three years in the table above are for replacement purposes
only.
The number of wells for 1975 has been estimated as shown for Agha Jar t
by adding the planned completions of 1975 to the actual number of producing
4The June, 1971 forecast called for an addition of 550 TBD in the fourth
quarter of 1972.
TBD/wel 1. L/B/D
(DD)
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
*
6
4
2-
3
8
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wells n 1974. Thus we have ignored the plan for 12 development com-
pletions during 1974, but the actual data on producing wells seem to support
the belief that the 1974 well-development plan was not fully carried out.
Using 1973 field data, wecalculate a decline rate for that year (for both
Asmari and Bangestan) of 6.1%.
The 1974 budget calls for four desalination plants to be installed
at Ahwaz, as well as an additional pumpset. These outlays are budgeted
at 5.537 million for additional gross capacity of 220 TBD (each desalina-
tion plant worth 55 TBD), for a capital coefficient for production facil-
ities of 25 per bd. The 1974 budget also carries as addenda both Ahwaz
fluid injection facilities at 17 million, and sand control procedures at
61 mllion. In neither case, however, s an estimate of capacity main-
tenance presented. Note that the expected output from all fields is always
calculated in the absence of fluid injection proarams.
The 1975 preliminary plan calls for a 55 TBD expansion in Ahwaz at
a cost of 0.55 per bd. With the drilling costs of developmental wells
amounting to less than 10 per bd, the production facilities and drilling
costs of gross capacity at Ahwaz-Asmari is about 35 per bd. But from exam-
ination of this data, we are unable to detect signs of rising marginal
cost of capacity development.
History of Ahwaz-Asmari
The 1964 and 1965 plans give an MAR of 500 TBD for about ten years,
prior to decline. New well capacities were thought to be limited to about
10 TBD. Crude from this field was attractive as Abadan refinery feedstock
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to offset declining Central Area fields, but both in 1964 and 1965, Ahwaz
production was not competitive for export via Kharg without installation
of a 135-mile MOL and additional pumps.5 In 1964, in fact, there was
sufficient well capacity available to permit expansion to offset the de-
clining CentralArea fields without need for further drilling.
The ultimate (probable) maximum capacity was stated in 1964 and 1965
at 600 TBD, with 200 TBD planned for 1969, and 288 TBD planned for 1970.
As of the beginning of 1974, Ahwaz-Asmari was to have installed capacity of
837 TBD of a targeted ultimate capacity of 1207 TBD. Ahwaz is currently a
candidate for both fluid injection and desalination facilities; the problem
of sand control was first mentioned in the June, 1971 development plan.
In 1964 and again in 1968, Ahwaz was considered a fairly expensive
source of crude. In the first instance, the development of KaranJ, Bibi
Hakimeh, and Marun were thought more attractive than the further development
of heavy export capacity from Ahwaz. In 1968, we read that the "augmentation
of heavy capacity...would require the very costly measure of proceeding
to the development of Rag-e-Safid or Ahwaz."6 For both the Tehran and
Abadan refineries, new fields were considered more attractive than expansion
at Ahwaz.
5Central Area fields refer to Lali, Masjd-e Suleiman, Haft Kel, and
Naft Safid.
....tt -Rveloent Plan, April, 1968, p. 5.
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III. Ahwaz-Bangestan (Depth = 14,000 ft.; API = 24.3° )
Pro. Wells Planned Output AC(TBD)
Completions (TBD) (gross) (repl)
1972 (22)* (281)* 15
1973 1* 24* 61
1974 6* (9) 83* 144 115
1975 11 5 150 65
1976 48 37 287 555
1977 49 1 700 15 15
1978 57 8 712 1ll 56
*actual data; 1972 data in parentheses for both Ahwaz-A
TBD/wel 1
(12.8)*
24*
13.8*
13.6
6.0
14.3
12.5
and Ahwaz-B
Discovered in 1971, this deep pool appears to have been one of the
major sources for the growth plan of output (to reach 8 mbd by end-1976),
yet all indications so far are that it has not lived up to these earlier
hopes. In the June, 1971 forecast, Ahwaz-B is thought to have an indicated
well potential of 40 TBD, although temporary installed facilities at the
time had a capacity of only 15 TBD.
The depth of the field is responsible for the hiqh drilling costs of
development, especially high by comparison with those of Ahwaz-A. The
forecast of 1973 called for more than 10% of all OSCO completions to occur
in Ahwaz-B. So far it appears that the drilling program is not on schedule.
The 1975 preliminary budget calls for four production units in Ahwaz-B
together with a wellhead separator cluster, with a combined initial
capacity of 650 TBD, to be installed in 1975 and 1976. The estimated cost
was over I10 million, for a capital cost per bd of 15.7. In the 1975
L/B/D
(DD)
45
134
173
.9
71
together.
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budget, 1 million is listed for detailed engineering'for fluid injection
facilities in both Ahwaz-B and Karanj; as an addendum in the 1976 prelim-
inary production program budget, we find Ahwaz-B fluid injection facilities
carried at 13.4 million, but no indication of capacity is given. The
1977 tentative budget calls for an unspecified production unit expansion
in the Bangestan area of 50 TBD at a capital cost of 12.7 per bd. If
we combine the facilities and drilling capital costs for the years 1975
and 1976, we have capital costs per barrel in the neighborhood of 150
and 189, respectively. These figures, of course, do not include any
inflation or discounting adjustment nor any costs of items other than those
considered above.
History of Ahwaz-Bangestan
In the June, 1971 plan, OSCO points out that development is occurring
increasingly in fields where wells are deeper and less productive. At that
time, however, the well-potential in the Bangestan pool was thought to be
about 40 TBD, and additional production wells were to be installed. In
the period through 1978, Bangestan was expected to be second only to Marun
for the planned growth in output, with a targeted ultimate capacity of 750
TBD. Fluid injection was planned for 1978. Yet the 1973 plan admits that
the field is in very early stages of development, and that there is limited
knowledge of its producing characteristics. The 1972 plan had been somewhat
more optimistic, believing that the pool would produce at 150 TBD through
1975. But it had also stated that there was a great need for evaluation,
and that problems with sand and water were expected.
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IV. Bibi Hakimeh (Depth = 6,800 ft.; API = 29.8 ° )
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) C(TBD) TBD/well +/B/D
Completions (gross=repl) (DD)
1972 15* 448* 456 29.9*
1973 16* 379* 453 23.7*
1974 18* (3) 369* 400 35 20.1* 7
1975 22 4 400 68 18.2 5
1976 28 6 400 90 14.3 17
1977 32 4 400 62 12.5 4
1978 34 2 377 29 11.1 2
* actual data
The 1969 development plans had shown Bibi Hakimeh peaking at 445 TBD;
actual output from this field peaked most recently at 456 TBD in 1970.
7
A decline rate calculated from 1970 through 1974 is equal to 5.3 per year;
Our calculated decline rate for 1973 only is 3.2%. he 1973 forecast calls
for output to be maintained at 400 TBD through 1977, then to fall to 377
TBD in 1978. All capacity added in the five years to 1978 is for maintenance
purposes only, and the capital costs per bd are for the developmental
drilling expenditures associated with maintaining this level of capacity.
The 1974 budget includes no expenditures for Bibi Hakimeh production
facilities, but the 1975 budget includes as firm 61.520 million for one
desalination plant ( 55 TBD), or 627.6 per bd. The cost-per bd of main-
tained capacity in 1976 is therefore about 644 (27 + 617) per bd, for
7The 1967 plan suggested that in 1970 Bibi Hakimeh would be fully developed,
with an output rate of 530 TBD.
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production facilities and drilling only. As an addendum item in the 1975
production facilities budget, we find the amount of 614.3 million for
fluid njection facilities, but no capacity figure is attached. Bibi
Hakimeh facilities are not elucidated at all in the plans for later years.
There were 16 producing wells in 1973 and 18 in 1974. We have again
added the planned completions for 1975 to the actual number of wells in 1974,
and then calculated well productivity.
History of Bibi Hakimeh
The 1964 and 1965 plans placed the ultimate (probable) maximum
capacity of the field at 650 TBD, with an MAR of 550-600 TBD. Yet the
current forecasts put the field at 400 TBD or less. Capacity planned for
1969 was 190 TBD as of 1964, and 340 TBD in 1970 (actual output in 1970
was 456 TBD).
In the early years the field was considered very attractive for ex-
pansion, with 20 TBD well-potentials, as long as additional boosters were
not needed at the Gurreh booster station. Distances were short to Gurreh,
and there was sufficient gravity flow for moderate expansion. While some
difficulties with flowing wellhead pressure might be experienced in the
future, Gachsaran and Bibi Hakimeh were in 1966 considered the major sources
of growth in heavy production for export. It appears that in fact Bibi
Hakimeh has been developed rather slowly after its discovery in 1961, for
during most of the 1960's, expansion in light capacity was preferred to
expansion in heavy capacity. Only in 1971 and 1972 were the beginnings of
capacity maintenance techniques to be introduced into Bibi Hakimeh: one
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wellhead separator in the first of those years, and two in the second.
But by comparison with Ahwaz, the 1964 report points out that the devel-
opment of Bibi Hakimeh is more attractive. At that time, the incremental
costs of developing either Karanj or Marun or of expanding Bibi Hakimeh
were not expected to be different, for all involved drilling wells, in-
stalling production units and MOL's, as well as a Gurreh intermediate
booster station. Again, the gravity characteristics of Bibi Hakimeh are
cited as attractive.
The 1968 forecast suggests that both Bibi Hakimeh and Gachsaran will
be fully developed by the beginning of the fourth quarter in 1969, and
that' further new heavy sources will come from the much more costly fields
of Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid. At that time, new field tests for heavy sources
were in progress.
Nowhere in the forecasts of later years is Bibi Hakimeh cited as a
future growth source of any significant size, and output rates of 600 TBD
are not reiterated. The main source of future heavy growth was to have
been from Ahwaz-Bangestan. Bibi Hakimeh was forecast to begin its decline
by the second quarter of 1978, but this decline may have already begun.
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V. Gachsaran (Depth = 7,000 ft., API = 31.20)
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) C(TBD) TBD/Well -/B/D
Completions (gross) (repl) (DD)
1972 29* 866* 940 29.9*
1973 29* 887* 972 30.6*
1974 30* (3) 912* 940 100 100 30.4* 1.7
1975 38 8 967 217 62 25.4 4
1976 43 5 1050 139 = 139 24.4 2
1977 50 7 1050 158 = 158 21.0 4
1978 56 6 1050 131 = 131 18.8 4
*actual data
Earlier forecasts had shown Gachsaran output to peak at 940 TBD in 1971,
and to remain at that level through 1980. It is only the 1973 forecast,
however, which gives the new and higher peak of 1050 TBD to be reached in
1976 and maintained through 1978, 1973 reserve and output fiqures give a
decline rate of 6.7%.
The 1974 budget calls for an expenditure of 1.830 million for a new
production unit with an initial capacity of 110 TBD (16.6 per bd), and
6231,000 for booster pumps, for a total capital coefficient of 18.7 per bd.
Gachsaran fluid injection facilities, as addenda, are carried in the 1974
budget at 26 million. No further specific reference is made for expenditures
in Gachsaran in later years. The capital coefficient, including developmental
drilling, is thus approximately 23 per bd.
Well productivity at Gachsaran is among the highest in the OSCO area
at over 30 TBD. If the proposed developmental wells are indeed completed,
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average well output at Gachsaran will fall in the latter part of the period
to about the average of all OSCO wells producing.in 1974.
History of Gachsaran
In 1964, Gachsaran was assigned an MAR of 700 TBD which was thought
sufficient to meet the projected 1969 target capacity of 670 TBD. Actual
output in 1969 was at a rate of 693 TBD. Ultimate (probable) maximum capacity
was placed at 800 TBD in 1964; planned capacity for 1970 was 795 TBD. But
by 1965 nstalled capacity was 800 TBD. By 1972 maximum capacity was put
at 940 TBD (note that this was exceeded n 1973). The field was early
thought to have high well potentials, and to be very attractive for develop-
ment. In 1966, Gachsaran together with Bibi Hakimeh were to serve as the
sources of heavy growth, since Rag-e-Safid and Ahwaz were considered more
costly.
As of 1964, there was significant spare well capacity available in
the field; installed unit capacity was greater than the existing line
capacity. This was one of the major reasons for seeing Gachsaran as a
source of future growth in heavy export. Future development depended upon
either ncreasing line capacity to meet well capacity, or increasing both
line and unit capacity (the latter by 100 TBD) to a rate which did not
require an ntermediate pump station.
In the early 1970's, replacement drilling crews were active in Gach-
saran. It should be noted that replacement wells are believed to be more
productive than original producing wells, and are installed in the more
prolific fields already developed. While there is brief mention of the need
Capital Development Plan and Program 1972-1976, June, 1971, p. 42.
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for four wellhead separators in the 1970-1972 period for the purposes of
capacity maintenance, it is the "maintenance of well flowing ability and
associated economic problems, rather than reservoir performance, likely
in later years to be the main limit of production."8
8 ook-Ahead Plans for Crude Production Capacity, 1966-1970, June, 1965,
Ap-pendix i p. I -4 .
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VI. Paris (Depth = 5,700 ft., API = 33.9°)
i; - Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) AC(TBD) TBD/Well -k/B/D
Completions (gross=repl) (DD)
1972 15* 366* 462 24.4*
1973 15* 445* 450 29.7*
1974 12* (-) 423* 450 - 35.2* -
1975 14 2 450 50 32.1 1.3
1976 16 2 450 46 38.1 1.3
1977 19 3 450 63 23.7 2.4
1978 21 2 445 38 21.2 1.7
*actual data
Earlier forecasts stressing light crude oil development (made in 1969),
projected a peak level of output from Paris at 675 TBD occurring in 1974,
and staying at that level through 1980. 9 Clearly the 1973 forecast has
been revised downward (note that actuary output declined by 5% in 1974),
and the 450 TBD target has yet to be reached. 1973 figures give a decline
rate of 10.4%. Developmental drilling expenditures, however, are small,
and perhaps with more outlay in this field the target level of capacity
can be realized. No specific production facilities with capacity additions
are stated in the forecast for Paris; the 1974 budget does contain a well-
head separator item in Paris budgeted at just over 1.8 million. As an
addendum in the 1975 budget we find 12.1 million for fluid injection fac-
o9ne of the 1969 forecasts suggests that Paris will be fully developed in
1975, with an output rate of 544 TBD.
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il1ites at Paris.
Well productivity in Paris is second only to KaranJ throughout the
whole OSCO area. While 1974 saw a decline in the number of producing wells
from the previous year, future plans have called for a greater number of
producing wells, ultimately lowering per-well output to near 20 TBD, or
about the current OSCO average.
History of Paris
Paris was discovered in 1964 and assiqned in the next year an MAR of
135 TBD. As of 1965, the ultimate (probable) maximum capacity was placed
at 300 TBD, and a capacity of 25 TBD was planned for 1970. Actual output
in 1970 was only 12 TBD, but jumped to 324 TBD in 1971. In 1971, capacity
expected in 1975 and 1976 in Paris was 680 TBD, but by 1973 these figures
had been revised downward to 450 TBD, with capacity set at 445 TBD in 1978.
Full development of the field was scheduled for 1975 as early as 1969.
Well productivity has been high in Paris, and OSCO has been able to
utilize the natural energy of the field for its transport to. Karanj, and
from there to the Agha Jari MOL for export. In the Preferential Light
Plan of March, 1969, the fields of Karanj and Paris were to be brought on
stream sooner than earlier calculated, and a bit ahead of Marun, deferring
until 1976 the development of Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid. The consolidation of
boosters at all three of the above light crude fields was to be achieved
so as to reduce costs. Later in June of 1969, Paris,Karanj, and Marun were
cited as the main sources of growth in light export. In June of 1971, the
plan called for the exclusive development in 1975 of Paris, KaranJ, and
Marun, again deferring the development of heavy until 1976. While Paris
continues to be a candidate for injection, it appears to be far lower in
importance than Marun.
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VII. Marun (Depth =11,000 ft., API - 32.80)
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) AC(TBD) TBD/Well 4/B/D
Completions: (gross) (repl) (DD)
1972 30* 1003* 1070 33.4*
1973 30* 1052* 1060 35.1*
1974 35* (20) 1054* 1166 513 58 30.1* 39
1975 46 11 1541 306 136 33.5 8
1976 47 1 1710 - - 36.4 -
1977 50 3 1710 37 = 37 34.2 12
1978 56 6 1710 162 = 162 30.5 7
*actual data
Crude oil from the Marun field is, like that from Paris, a light oil.
Under the Preferential Light Plan of 1969, output from Marun was to peak at
1240 TBD in 1976, and to remain at that level through 1980.10 In the fall
of 1973, future output was revised upward to the level of 1710 TBD. The
1973 decline rate for Marun is 7.2%. Like Ahwaz, larun has both a shallow
or Asmari zone as well as a deeper or Bangestan zone, but almost all plans
are for the known Asmari part of the field discovered in 1964.11
In the first two years of the forecast above, net capacity grows, while
in the last two years, all capacity changes are for maintenance purposes
only. Clearly capacity maintenance is much more expensive in Marun than in
Paris..
1 0 In another forecast of 1969, Marun was to be fully developed in 1976,
with an output rate of 996 TBD.
61.115 million was to be spent in 1974 for four developmental wells of
30 TBD total capacity in Marun-B (37 per bd), but no developmental drillinq
in the Bangestan area is specifically indicated thereafter.
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According to the forecast, twenty developmental wells were to have
been completed in Marun during 1974, far more than actually entered pro-
duction during that year.
It isour feeling at this point that the Marun goal will not be reached,
even though the target for 1973 was almost realized in 1974. Marun lies
at a depth of 11,000 feet (Paris at 5,700 feet), and may have already begun
its decline. Remember that the projected level of 1710 TBD is not based on
the implementation of fluid injection facilities; on the other hand, the
single largest addendum item for fluid injection facilities for any field is
the 642 million for Marun, which may mean that with such facilities installed,
the field may continue to produce over 1000 TBD for the foreseeable future.
History of Marun
Like Paris, Marun was discovered in 1964. The field was assigned an
MAR of 500 TBD and an ultimate (probable) maximum capacity of 600 TBD at
that time, both of which figures are well above those for Paris. Strangely
enough, planned capacity for 1969 (made in 1964) was 240 TBD, and for 1970
(made in 1965) revised downward to 225 TBD. In the fall of 1972, 1975
capacity of Marun was placed at 1860 TBD, but In the plan of the fall of
1973, it was revised downward to 1541 TBD for 1975, then to rise to 1710 TBD
for each of the next three years. 1974 output proceeded at a rate of 1054
TBD, falling short of the capacity target for 1974 (in the 1973 plan) of
1166 TBD.
The growth in the actual output figures for 1971 and 1972 support the
plans stated in the June, 1969 report, which called for extensive devel-
opment and replacement well drilling in Marun.
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In both 1969 and 1971, however, certain problems had begun to develop
at Marun. In the first of the two years, the decision was to bring on KaranJ-
Paris sooner than Marun because of idle well capacity in those two fields,
as well as to allow a "pause" in Marun for the resolution of "uncertainties."
These uncertainties are not specified there, but in the 1971 plan we find
acknowledgment of coning failure in Marun. In 1972 five wellhead separators
are to be installed to maintain capacity. In the 1973 plan, Marun is a
candidate for fluid injection facilities, and is also reported to have need
of desalination equipment. Prior to the development of the problems in
1969 and 1971, Marun was considered very favorable for low-cost light crude
production.
With reserves now carried at 8.9 billion barrels, Marun was considered
as early as the year of its discovery to be a major reserve. At that time,
there was little information of well productivities, but the wells were
then producing at 25 TBD. While a fairly deep field, it lay only a few
hundred feet above sea level. It was expected in 1964 to be a source of
gas,' and indeed there are gas processing installations now in Marun. It
was relatively easy to develop,. for it was only a short distance to the
Haft Kel lines, and could be developed easily to offset the output of the
declining Central Area fields. By 1966, Marun was considered to be a prime
source of light export growth.
In both of the last two capital development plans, Marun and Ahwaz-
Bangestan are cited as the prime sources of light and heavy growth, respect-
ively, from existing fields. By 1975 the Asmari zones of both of these
fields are expected to be nearly completely developed, so that it will be
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necessary thereafter to depend more heavily on smaller field sources.l2
Marun continues to be a candidate for fluid injection facilities, with
the start-up of injection tentatively scheduled for 1976.
The "final" expansion of Marun is to take place in the fall of 1975
when a new production unit with a capacity of 225 TBD is installed, as
well as looping of the field's main oil line and the installation of
additional pumping capacity.
Christopher Rand in his book, Making Democracy Safe for Oil (Little-
Brown, 1975), suggests that the Marun field "had languished undeveloped"
after 1964 due to its remoteness from Kharg.1 3 This seems patently untrue.
In 1968-1969 the Shah allegedly threatened to take the field over, according
to Rand, unless Consortium output, and therefore payments due the Shah,
were increased. According to Rand, "the Consortium gave in and promised
to expand Marun faster than it had wanted to. In turn," Rand continues,
"the Consortium held back production of Iranian Heavy.... This was a good
resolution for the Consortium because now it could increase payments
without much increasing production."l4
As early as the August, 1967 Plan, however, a proposal to develop
12Recall that as early as February, 1969, Marun was expected to be fully
developed in 1976.
13Rand, pp. 148-149. The fact that Marun commenced production at 26.5 TBD
in 1966, and rose to 100 and 333 TBD in 1967 and 1968 does not suggest
that the field had "languished undeveloped."
1 4 Ibid., p. 149. On this point, see the discussion of the historical
development of Rag-e-Safid.
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fully light capacity in Marun, Karanj, and Paris in 1971 and 1972 was
put forward. This would result in a cost saving of 4.4 million over
the development of the same volume of heavy in Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid dur-
ing those two years. As of that date, this was not the principal plan,
but only another "Possible Alternative" plan for 1971 and 1972. Whether
the deferment of development of Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid is explained by
Rand's version, or strictly by reason of economy is not known. Marun
capacity did expand rapidly as shown in following development plans, but
there is never any hint that the rate was "faster" than desired, nor that
the development of heavy capacity was influenced by anything other than
cost.
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VIII. Karanj (Depth = 7,800 ft., API = 33.8 ° )
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) AC(TBD) TBD/Well +t/B/D
Completions (gross=repl) (DD)
1972 4* 188* 200 47*
1973 7* 271* 262 38.7*
1974 8* (-) 316* 300 - 39.5* 
1975 10 2 300 37 30.0 1.6
1976 10 - 300 - 30.0
1977 11 1 300 31 27.3 .6
1978 12 1 300 29 25.0 .6
*actual data
Discovered in 1963, KaranJ is also a producer of light crude. The
plans made in 1969 suggested that the field would be fully developed in 1975
at a rate of 181 TBD, and would produce at a rate of 275 TBD through 1980.
By that earlier analysis, it indeed appears that the field is now fully
developed, and that only capacity maintenance measures will be undertaken
henceforward to maintain a level of 300 TBD through 1978. Developmental
drilling costs are amost non-existent, althoughwe calculate the 1973 decline
rate as 18.4%.
Karanj is not identified in any of the budget plans through 1978 for
any kind of production facilities spending. Only the 1975 budget lists
61 million for detailed engineering for fluid injection facilities in both
Ahwaz-B and in KaranJ, yet there is no follow-up addendum tem for fluid
injection capital spending thereafter. Wells in Karanj have to this date
been the most productive of all OSCO wells.
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History of Karan.i
With reserves of only 0.9 billion barrels, Karanj is a much less
substantial reserve than is Marun, yet both its MAR and ultimate capacity
as seen in 1964 and 1965 were nearly the same as those of Marun. In 1964,
the MAR for Karanj was 200-500 TBD, but changed to 450 in 1965. Its
ultimate capacity was placed at 600 TBD in 1964, and at 550 TBD in 1965.
In 1964, Karanj was to have a 1969 capacity of 40 TBD (actual output was
75 TBD), and in 1965 a capacity of 55 TBD (actual output in that year was
68 TBD). The big one-time jump in Karanj output came in 1971, when it
soared to 193 TBD from 68 TBDOnT 1970. Through 1978, no caoacity additions
are forecast; capacity is to remain constant at 300 TBD, close to the
31.6TBD rate of output in 1974.
The capital plan of February, 1969 heralded the large expansion of
output in 1971, for in 1969 both Karanj and Paris were known to have idle
well capacity, which would be utilized in both fields by the fourth
quarter of 1971. Both Karanj and Paris outputs were thought to make
better use of the light MOL than Marun, especially given the "uncertainties"
in Marun. Since the wells were shallower in both Karanj and Paris than
in Marun, the capacity buildup in those fields was more attractive for
capacity per string year was larger there than in Marun.. Output in
KaranJ in 1971 was 184% greater than in 1970, and in Paris was 2700% above
the rate in 1970. In the same interval, Marun output increased only 30%.
Karanj has always been considered a low-cost field. In 1964, it
was cited as having individual well potentials of up to 40 TBD, and its
well productivity currently is about that rate. In 1964 and 1965, capital
costs per daily barrel were estimated at less than 8. While the field
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was located high above sea level and had to cross Agha Jari to join the
Kharg export line, the expenditure for the MOL was considered well worth
it for the future output to come from both Karanj and Paris.
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IX. Rag-e-Safid (Depth = 8,300 ft., API = 28.1°)
Pro. Wells Planned Output (TBD) AC(TBD) TBD/Well t/B/D
Completions (gross) (repl) (DD)
1972 4* 35* 75 8.8*
1973 10* 174* 181 17.4*
1974 18* (4) 313* 295 35 = 35 17.4* 15
1975 22 4 295 31 = 31 13.4 9
1976 31 9 307 85 28 9.9 11
1977 36 5 345 42 = 42 9.6 16
1978 40 4 345 30 = 30 8.6 8
*actual data
Of the fields considered above, Rag-e-Safid is one of two fields in
which actual output for 1974 exceeded the projected level of output for
that year. We calculate the 1973 decline rate as 4.4%.
Plans for Rag-e-Safid made in 1969 (when the concentration was on
the rapid development of light crude capacity) showed the field reaching
a high rate of output in 1979 and 1980 of 325 TBD. Since that time,
revisions have brought this heavier output forward in time even more
rapidly than the 1973 forecast required. The 1974 budget called for a
spare pumpset costing 164,000. The 1976 budget includes 400,000 for
detailed engineering of fluid injection facilities for Rag-e-Safid, as
well as an expansion in one production unit of 50 TBD at a capital cost of
653,000 (61.06 per bd). If all of these capital expenditures are attributed
to the new capacity of 1976, and combined with the developmental drilling
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costs, we have a capital coefficient of about 25 per bd.
History of Rag-e-Safid
Discovered in 1964, Rag-e-Safid has been the subject of continuous
discussion, and deferment of ultimate capacity development. With reserves
carried at 2.4 billion barrels, it is approximately the same size as Paris.
It has both an Asmari pool and a deeper Bangestan pool. In 1965, it was
assigned an admittedly conservative MAR of 110 TBD for Asmari and 45 TBD
for Bangestan. Its ultimate (probable) maximum capacity was placed in
that year at 250 TBD, of which 200 TBD were allocated to the Asmari region.
The 1965 report Indicates a planned capacity of 50 TBD for 1970; actual
output in that year was only 8 TBD. As of fall, 1973, capacity planned
for 1978 is 345 TBD, with 1974 output almost at that level already.
Throughout the period that the capital development plans cover, there
has been in effect a tug-of-war between the plans for developing heavy
capacity and those for developing light capacity. Light capacity won during
most of the 1960's, as output grew rapidly from Paris, Karanj, and Marun.
Always the development of heavy capacity in Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid was
considered unattractively costly, and was deferred. But output from these
fields jumped precipitously in 1973 from year-earlier levels: Rag-e-Safid
by nearly a factor of 5, from 35 TBD to 174 TBD, and Ahwaz by nearly a
factor of 3, from 281 TBD to 817 TBD.
The plan of August, 1967 called for the earlier development of heavy
rather than light capacity; by this plan capacity in this field was to
rise to 200 TBD in 1971 from 34 TBD in 1970. An alternative possibility
was presented, however, at this date, such that the development of heavy
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export capacity at Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid would be deferred until 1972 at
a saving of 3.4 million. Rag-e-Safid required a 36" MOL from Ahwaz, and
drilling costs there were higher than in Ahwaz. But the Principal Plan of
August, 1968 and plans thereafter called for the maintenance of merely
50 TBD in Rag-e-Safid until well into the future. Growth in heavy was
to come from Gachsaran, Bibi Hakimeh, and Ahwaz, with Marun providing
growth in light. The Principal Plan and the Revised Preferential Light
plan in the first quarter of 1969 showed capacity to remain at 50 TBD in
Rag-e-Safid through 1975, to rise to 62 TBD in 1976, to 137 TBD in 1977,
and ultimately to 325 TBD in 1980. Yet in the August, 1970 forecast,
capacity was to be increased from 50 TBD in 1971 to 75 TBD in 1972,
doubled in 1973, and rise to 225 TBD in 1975. The development plans which
follow show that capacity was to be at 150 TBD in 1973, and from 275-295
TBD in 1974. The changes in approach regarding the timing of the development
of this field are reflected in the actual output figures for the producing
history of the field (see Table A).
The reasons for the deferment can be picked up through the various
development plans. In April, 1968 it was recognized that there would be a
small deficiency in heavy export in 1969; it could not be overcome "since
all readily accessible field sources of heavy are already scheduled to be
completely developed by the end of the third quarter of 1969.15 It was at
15Capital Development Plan, April, 1968, p. 5.
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this point that the statement cited earlier was made: "augmentation of
heavy capacity beyond that point would require the very costly measure
of proceeding to the development of Rag-e-Safid or Ahwaz. For the same
reason it was also considered prudent to accept a small deficiency of
developed heavy capacity in 1971." Nonetheless some advancement of heavy
capacity from 1970 to 1969 was recommended in the April, 1968 Plan, but
it was to come from the buildup of capacity in Gachsaran and Bibi Hakimeh.
In the February, 1969 Principal Plan, in which major additions to
capacity in this field were not to occur before 1977, it is stated that
"all heavy options require high investment in export main oil lines. Lower
investment for these facilities is required for light export development."1 6
When the Revised Preferential Light Plan followed only a month later,
heavy crude development was deferred until 1976. The August, 1970 Plan
points out that the growth in the planning period from 1972-1974 was to
come from the development of heavy in Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid. More importantly,
this Plan states that there will be very little undeveloped capacity in
the major fields by 1975, and lists the order of testing new fields. The
development of Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid appears to rank only marginally ahead
of the development of new fields.
But in June of 1971, the company is again relying on the exclusive
development of Karanj, Paris, and Marun, all of which are light fields.
This plan adds, however, that by 1976 there will by a need to develop lesser
and more costly sources, such as Ahwaz-Bangestan and Kupal, both of which
1 6Alternative Crude Oil Capacity Development Plans, 1970-1972, February
1769, p. 3.
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provide heavy oil. The big increment in heavy capacity in both Rag-e-
Safid and in Ahwaz came in 1973 and 1974.
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II. Capacity Maintenance
In the past several months, the trade press has suggested that large
capacity-maintenance projects are commencing in the-major Consortium fields
of Agha Jari, Ahwaz, Bibi Hakimeh, Gachsaran, Paris, Marun, Karanj, and
Rag-e-Safid. As early as 1969 the Capital Development Plans indicated spe-
cific pieces of equipment to be installed in various fields for the purpose
of maintaining capacity. The last two plans of 1972 and 1973 indicate
desalination and fluid injection projects as well. The 1973 report states
that existing wells, if nothing other than routine maintenance operations
were undertaken, would experience a decline in capacity of about 50% during
1
the planning period. This decline in capacity amounts to 17.8% per year
over the period 1974-1978.
A. Fluid Injection
Capacity maintenance activity takes many forms, only one of which
is fluid injection of either gas or water. The 1973 Plan discusses fluid
injection projects using the following schedule (see Table I), in which
all but Binak are carried as addenda items, for at that time these pro-
jects were by no means firm.
1Capital Development Plan and Program 1974-1978 (September, 1973), p. 22
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Table I
Fluid Injection Plan
Commencement of Full
Field Injection Injection
Binak 1975 1975
Ahwaz (Asmari) 1976 1977
Marun 1976 1977
Gachsaran 1976 1977
Paris 1977 1978
Bibi Hakimeh 1977 1978
Agha Jari 1977 1978
Haft Kel 1977 1977
Karanj 1978 1978
Ahwaz (Bangestan) 1978 1979
Rag-e-Safid 1979 1979
The report continues:
(F)luid injection will be a significant factor in maintaining
well potentials in the future, but there will be a time lag be-
tween implementation of the injection schemes and realization
of the full effect of the fluid injection upon reservoir and
well performance. It is therefore anticipated that the full
impact will not be effective . . . until near the end of the
planning period.2
The 1974 program budget called for the injection of 65 TBD of Persian
Gulf water into Binak, at a cost of 2.15 million (with 6500,000 addenda
for Binak as well), but no estimate of capacity gain is given. Engineer-
ing was under way for water injection and supply methods for Ahwaz and
2Ibid., p. 22. The planning period is 1974 through 1978.
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Karanj fluid injection facilities (6 1 million) in the 1975 program.
Nowhere in the discussion of fluid injection plans is expected capacity
gain given.
During the whole period, 31.3 strings were to be used to complete
166 injector and 42 source wells.3 Table II below shows the planned
fluid injection drilling costs through 1978.4
Table II
Fluid Injection Drilling Plans
Strings Rig Days Expenditure 6/Rig Day
(.6 '000)
1974 .1.25 427 6 2,863. 6 6,705
1975 7.35 2,512 16,832 6,701
1976 5.30 1,812 12,137 6,698
1977 9.40 3,213 21,526 6,700
1978 8.00 2,734 ' 18,320 6- ,701
31.3 10,698 671,678 6 6,700
The production facilities program for 1974 carries as addenda items
expenditures for fluid injection facilities amounting to 685 million at
three fields: Ahwaz (17), Gachsaran (26), and Marun (42). The pre-
liminary-addenda plan for 1975 adds four more fields as candidates for
fluid Injection facilities, with 637.3 mIllion to be spent at Paris
(612.1), Bibi Hakimeh (14.3), Agha Jar (7.4), and Haft Kel (63.5).
3 Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., Figure 40.
In the preliminary-addendumr plan for 1976, 627.6 million more are to be
spent t Karanj (14.2) and at Ahwaz-Bangestan (613.4). As a non-
addendum item in that year, 400,000 was planned for detailed fluid engin-
eering for Rag-e-Safid, with 10.3 million carried as addendum for fluid
injection facilities at that field in the tentative program of 1977. No
other fluid injection expenditures were carried in either 1977 or 1978.
Thus the 1973 Plan was considering fluid injection facilities expen-
ditures of about 6161 million as well as fluid injection drilling expen-
ditures of 71.7 million or about 233 million all told over the five-
year period. In dollar terms, this translates to about $560 million, well
below the figure of $1.5 billion which has been reported as the amount to
be spent on fluid injection projects in the current year.
Our problem is to estimate the capital cost per barrel of capacity
maintained through fluid injection techniques. ,We assume that the amount
of $1.5 billion is indeed spent now to stabilize capacity at 6 mbd or
at 2.2 billion barrels annually over a 25-year period. We assume for
simplicity a decline rate (a) of 10% per year and a discount factor (r)
of 10% per year as well. We may then express the present barrel equiva-
lents as follows:
-rt 25 {a+r)tdt
PBEt = 2.2e rtdt - 2.2 e-
0
e-rt) (a+r) 25
2.2. -4.96 +r
: 2.2[9.18 - 4.96]
- 9.28 billion barrels
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Thus the capital cost per barrel of such capacity maintained is $1.5
billion divided by 9.28 billion barrels, or $0.16 per barrel. Clearly the
cost would be much lower were we to use the Plan's figure of $560
million and telescope its expenditure into one year rather than.over the
full five year period. Using a slightly shorter horizon of 20 years and
$1.5 billion raises the per-barrel cost only marginally.
B. Desalination
In the same 1973 Capital Development Plan, surface facilities modi-
fications are cited as instrumental for capacity maintenance. Of these,
desalination plants appear likely to play a large role in the future. At
that time there were no desalination facilities, so that "any well which
produces excessive salt is restricted or closed in, with consequent reduc-
5
tion in available capacity." The plan called for the installation of 25
desalination plants "in selected fields where gains can be foreseen";
these fields are Ahwaz, Marun, Agha Jari, Kupal, Kharg, Bibi Hakimeh,
Karanj, Rag-e-Safid, Mansuri, Paris, Lab-e-Safid, Pazanan, and Chashmeh
Khush, with initial development at the first five fields only.6
During the planning period, 25 desalination plants are to be construc-
ted at an expected cost of 37.1 million. It was anticipated that "by
1978 the total gain in capacity due to the operation of these plants will
5
Ibid., p. 23. Excessive salt content is defined as more than eleven
pounds of salt per thousand barrels.
6Ibid.
.. M.. -.
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be at least 220,000 BPD." 7 Thus the average capital coefficient is
6168.8 per bd. But the desalination program is to be implemented accord-
ing to wellhead separator capacities of 55 TBD each. "This sizing has been
selected to correspond to production unit separator banks thus permitting
segregation of wet and dry crudes at the beginning of the field processing
train. ,,8
Table III below shows the firm desalination plans for 1974, as
well as the preliminary and tentative plans thereafter. While no specific
capacity figures for any production unit plant are given after 1974, we
continue to assume 55 TBD. Note that the sum of the plants planned totals
26 and total expenditures amount to 31.5 million, whereas the Plan states
that 25 plants will be installed at a cost of 37.1 million.9 The other
discrepancy is with the amount of capacity to be gained through these
plants: 25 plants at 55 TBD each would generate 1375 TBD yet the Consor-
tium planners expected that the total gain by 1978 will be (at least)
220 TBD. That figure suggests that by 1978 only four of the planned units
will be operational.
If we were now to make the same assumptions regarding decline rate
and discount factor as we did previously for present barrel equivalents,
and were to combine the expenditures for both fluid injection ($1.5 billion)
and desalination facilities ($75.6 million), we arrive at a per-barrel
Ibid., p. 23.
8Ibid., p. 27.
9Note also that Pazanan and Chashmeh Khush are not included in the facilities,
although they were mentioned on p. 23 of the Plan.
Table III
Desalination Plants
Field
1974 Ahwaz
Marun
Agha Jari
Kupal
Kharg
Production
Unit
PU-1
PU-2
PU-3
PU-4
PU-1
PU-1
PU-1
PU-1
Capacity
(TBD)
55
55
55
55
55
65
55
55
Expenditure
(6'000)
61420
1225
1350
1250
1150
1100
1400
755
Average = 21.4
Average = 21.4
1975 Agha Jari
Marun
Bibi Hakimeh
1976 Agha Jari
Marun
Bibi Hakimeh
1977 Agha Jari
Marun
Karanj
Rag-e-Safid
Mansuri
Lab-e-Safid
PU-2
PU-3
PU-2
PU-3
PU-2
1555
1555
1410
1410
1520
67450
Average = 27.1
2 units
2 units
1 unit
128.3
28.3
25.6
25.6
27.6
L9600
Average = 34.9
2 units
2 units
1 unit
1 unit
1 unit
1 unit
Average 4800
Average = 10.9
L/B/D
L25.8
22.3
24.5
22.7
20.9
16.9
25.5
13.7
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capital coefficient of $0.17 per barrel.
C. Other Surface Facilities Modifications
Surface facilities modifications continue to have an impor-
tant effect upon offsetting decline of well potential and
upon optimizing it in the fe of declining reservoir and
flowing wellhead pressures.
Such facilities include wellhead separators to permit production to
flow at lower wellhead pressures "with enhancement of well potential", flow-
line looping to reduce pressure loss from wells to production units, well-
head separators equipped with booster pumps to reduce flowing wellhead
pressures, and debottlenecking, such that valves and manifolding at well-
head separators and production units are adapted to changing conditions.11
Such plans for optimization of crude recovery and improvement in opera-
tional efficiency are carried as addenda in 1975 through 1977, but no
estimates of capacity gained are given.
During the 1975-1977 period, 6.36 million are (provisionally) to
be spent on such projects: 4.36 million in 1975, and 1 million in both
1976 and 1977. But since no capacity figures are attached to these pro-
posed amounts, we may not directly calculate per-barrel coefficients.
If we make the same assumptions concerning the decline rate and the
discount factor as we did earlier for present barrel equivalents, and if
we combine expenditures for fluid injection ($1.5 billion desalination
facilities ($75.6 million), and surface facilities modifications ($15.1
10bid p 22
Ibid., p. 22.
llIbid., p. 23.
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million), we arrive at a per-barrel capital coefficient-for maintained
capacity through all three methods together of $0.17 per barrel.
D. General Observations
Our method clearly results in estimates biased upward, for we have
forced all expenditures provisionally anticipated in the Plan during the
full period.to be spent in one year. We have also chosen to use the much
higher dollar figure for fluid injection facilities as proposed in the
press, rather than that of the (presumably understated) Capital Development
Plan. Yet the fact remains that even with these upward biases, the cost
of maintained capacity is remarkably cheap at approximately $0.17 per
barrel. Were we to inflate this figure by a factor of two, our conclusion
on the relative magnitude of the cost would be no different.
III. Rig-Day Drilling Costs, OSCO Area
Perhaps another way of seeking to establish whether marginal costs are
rising is to examine not only development drilling costs by field, but
development, exploratory, and workover costs per rig-day for the whole OSCO
area, on both an historical and anticipated basis (see Table I and Diagrams
I - IV).
Diagram I traces the average actual and estimated rig-day costs in
nominal British pounds for both exploratory and development drilling. Diagrams
II and III represent the same costs for exploratory and development drilling,
respectively, while Diagram IV shows workover drilling costs. The first
three figures are drawn to the same scale; no drilling category includes
fluid injection drilling costs. In all cases, the estimates for the five-
year period 1974-1978 come from the most recent September, 1973 forecast,
and are stated at estimated 1974 levels of costs for the next four years.
For that five-year estimate, 1974 plans are firm (* 10%), 1975 and 1976 are
preliminary (+ 15%), and 1977 and 1978 are tentative ( 25%).
Rising rig-day drilling costs are apparent in each diagram, with the
rate of rise increasing after 1970 for exploratory and development together,
after 1971 for exploratory drilling alone, and after 1970 for development
drilling solely. Development drilling costs rose as much in 1971 as they
had in the whole period to 1970; nearly the same is true for exploratory
drilling costs in 1972 when compared with the total preceding period. We
have not included actual rig-day costs for workover drilling in the total
- 47 -
picture of Diagram I, largely because we have actual figures for so few
years (1964, 1966, 1967, and 1968 only).
Forecast rig-day expenses are expected to rise , as is evident from
the dashed line in each case. The 1973 forecast revises substantially the
1974 and 1975 estimates of the preceding year: as much as 11-15% up for
the average, 23-24% up for exploratory, and 7-11% up for development. The
anticipated workover costs per rig-day are nearly twice as high in 1973 as
in 1972, before declining by roughly 400 for the remainder of the period.
We tend to doubt the accuracy of the workover forecasts, however, for the
years 1970, 1971, and 1972, for these data came from the Capacity Development
Plan of June, 1969, while the data for 1973, 1974, and 1975 came from the
Plan of October, 1972. We feel that the high figure for 1973, being much
closer to the planning date, is likely to be more accurate than the antici-
pations for 1971 and 1972 formed in 1969. Were we to connect the data of
1969 and 1973, we would nonetheless still have a very rapidly rising work-
over costpicture.
In dollar terms, the recent forecast expects a rig-day cost for the
sum of exploratory and development drilling of about $30,000, and of about
$11,000 for workover drilling. In 1964, by contrast, exploratory and
development rig-day costs together amounted to a little over $18,000 while
workover rigs cost $4500 on a daily basis.
Clearly the costs of daily rig activity have risen, and more recently
have reflected the plans for drilling under increasingly difficult conditions,
and in deeper, more remote, and less productive areas such as in Ahwaz-
Bangestan and in various new fields. We have no direct evidence of where
- 48 -
the major workover efforts will occur, although it is likely that they were
to be undertaken in many of the fields discussed in Chapter I.
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IV. Capacity Plans: Per-Barrel Capital Costs and Discounted Present
Worth
Per-Barrel Capital Costs
In each production plan, increments of capacity over the next several
years are forecast together with the capital costs of these production
facilities on a daily barrel basis. Some of the forecasts contain several
alternative development plans.
Table I summarizes the expected capacity additions and costs as
shown in each plan. All costs are for production facilities only, and ex-
clude NGL and terminal expenditures. Some forecasts include drilling
expenditures; others do not. In any case, these figures should be consid-
ered minimum estimates.
Diagram I graphs this data in nominal British pounds on a yearly (not
centered average) basis, where for each year the most up-to-date forecast
cost is used, i.e., 26.1 from line 6 is used for 1968 rather than any of
the other cost estimates for that year.
With the exception of the estimate for the year 1970, we have the
expected rising marginal cost curve. The 1970 estimate is taken from
line 10 at 42.1; had we plotted 29.0 from line 9 for 1970, our curve
would indeed rise smoothly. In dollar terms at 1973 price levels, the
capital cost per barrel in 1974 translates to $230. Building in a 12%
rate of inflation for 1974, we revise that amount upward to $258.
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But one may nonetheless search for an explanation of why such a steep
nominal rise occurred, especially given the difficulty of tracing arv
expectation of rising marginal developmental drilling cost within the fields
discussed in Chapter I. Throughout the Development Plans, "expensive"
sources such as Ahwaz and Rag-e-Safid were deferred in favor of other
prospects, but these fields' outputs finally increased markedly in 1973 and
1974. As early as 1970, the growth in heavy export during the period
1972-1974 was expected to come from those fields, and that report remarked
that because very little undeveloped capacity would remain in the major
fields by 1975, substantial tests in new fields were to be made.
It has become necessary to depend more heavily on smaller field sources,
to develop capacity in deeper and less productive fields, and to install
all the complementary facilities as gathering lines and MOL's. The days of
cheap development of such fields as Agha Jari, Bibi Hakimeh, Gachsaran,
Karanj, Marun, and Paris appear to be over.
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Discounted Present Worth
In a number of the Crude Production Capacity and Development Plans,
alternative development plans are put forward and then compared on both
an absolute cost level basis and on a "yearly cash-out discounted (basis)
at interest rates ranging from 20% to 30%." 1
The first mention of this type of discounting analysis appears in the
February, 1967 Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Capacity Development. Two plans
are put forward covering the years 1967 through 1970 and both emphasize
the development of light capacity.. This stress is stated as a departure
from the former approach toward balanced development of both light and
heavy export capacity. The target total crude capacity for 1967 was
2.558 mbd and for 1970 3.565 mbd.
The difference between Plans A and B occurs in 1968 and 1969, although
the total cost over the period is the same in both cases, resulting in
an average per-barrel capital cost of 27.8 (including expenditures for
drilling, field facilities, gathering lines main oil lines (MOL's), and
boosters). Plan A expands Marun in 1968 which requires expenditure for
an MOL, but this expansion is deferred a year in Plan B, at a saving in
1968 of 2.77 million.2 By contrast Plan B in 1969 is more expensive than
Crude Production Capacity and Development Plan, August, 1967, p. 27.
2
Plan, February 1967, Figure 13.
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Plan A in 1969 by the same 2.77 million, for the transport facilities
and boosters are installed then rather than in 1968. The capacity
changes and capital coefficients for both plans are shown below:
Look-Ahead Plans, February 1967
1967 1968 1969 Average
A B A B A B
+ '000 564 564 289 289 312 312 388
bd
I/b/d 21.30 21.30 50.03 40.45 19.13 28.01 27.87
While no specific discount factor is used, the report concludes
by stating that Plan B "has an obvious discounted cost advantage over
Plan A."3
The first real application, however, of this type of discounting
analysis appears six months later in the August, 1967 Plan, where three
possible alternative plans for heavy capacity development are evaluated.4
This Plan compares costs on an incremental (200 TBD) basis in each of
four years for three Cases:
Case I: Develop Rag-e-Safid 200 TBD preferentially. In this case
Rag-e-Safid is first developed to 200 TBD, followed by two increments of
200 TBD each in Ahwaz, and finally by expansion in Ahwaz of 75 TBD and in
Rag-e-Safid of 125 TBD.
3 Ibid., p. 19.
4After the fact, it appears that all three were set aside in favor of the
earlier emphasis on light capacity development.
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Case II: Develop Ahwaz preferentially. Under this version, the
first two 200 TBD increments come from Ahwaz, the third of 75 TBD in
Ahwaz plus 125 TBD in Rag-e-Safid, and finally the last 200 TBD increment
fully from Rag-e-Safid.
Case III: Develop Rag-e-Safid 325 TBD preferentially. Here the
first 200 TBD increment comes in Rag-e-Safid, the second is split between
Rag-e-Safid (125 TBD) and Ahwaz (75 TBD), and the third and fourth incre-
ments both come from Ahwaz.
The Plan points out that in Case I
"(c)omplete development of Rag-e-Safid is not carried out prior
to Ahwaz because as Case III indicates it is necessary to develop
Ahwaz for the second 200,000 B/D increment anyway, and once the
Ahwaz to Rag-e-Safid line has been constructed it is less costly
to develop capacity at Ahwaz, than to continue at Rag-e-Safid....
Case II provides for the complete development of Ahwaz before
Rag-e-Safid and Case III carries Rag-e-Safid development to its
ultimate before expanding to include Ahwaz." 5
For the first increment, costs were estimated at 01.6 million less to
develop Rag-e-Safid than Ahwaz, "even though Ahwaz benefits from a re-
quirement for less drilling (drilling costs are lower in Ahwaz), due to
existing well capacity in excess of installed production unit capacity.
Costs are high in all cases because of main-oil-line expenditures."6
Capital costs per barrel for each increment in each Case are pre-
sented (but not in discounted form), where costs include MOL pre-invest-
5Plan, August 1967, p. 24. Since that time "ultimate" for Rag-e-Safid
has been revised from .325 to 345 TBD.
6 Ibid., p. 25, emphasis added. MOL expenses for the first increment in
Case I were put at L2.4 million, and for the first increment in Case II,
at :1.6 million.
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ment and capital costs of pumps, MOL's, flowlines, wells, and production
units.
August, 1967 Plan
Case I Case II Case III
Increment 1 643.07 651.47 643.07
Increment 2 31.47 20.70 39.00
Increment 3 21.60 20.92 17.17
Increment 4 20.35 23.40 17.25
Graphically, we may render this as follows, where increasing marginal
cost is not clearly evident (see Diagram II).
While cumulatively the four increments would require 23.3 million
in expenditure, the present worth cost can be seen in the following Con-
7
sortium figure. The Plan concludes that although Case I "shows lower
discounted cash out at all three interest rates, the advantage is very
small. In fact none of the plans show a clear cut cost advantage. Factors
other than cost should, therefore, govern the field selected to be
developed first."8
The second use of discounting capital spending appears in the
Alternative Plans for Crude Oil Capacity Development, 1968-1972, dated
April, 1968. Four plans are presented calling for capacity additions
from 1968 through 1971: the Original, Principal, Modified Original, and
7Plan, August 1967, Figure 20.
Ibid., p. 27.
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Modified Principal Plans. A discount rate of 25% is used "based upon
estimated incidence of expenditure" for each plan, with the result that
the Principal Plan is. the less costly by 845,000 than its nearest rival.
"It is interesting to note however that the cost variations between.plans
are not great, less than 6% of the total on an undiscounted basis, and
9
less than 8% in present value." The report goes on to say:
"(T)he Principal Plan provides for a shift in emphasis from the
development of Light export capacity to the development of Heavy
export capacity for the years 1969 through 1971. Both the Original
and the Principal Plans develop the same capacity from the same
sources at the beginning, in the year 1968, and at the end, in
the year 1972. The two remaining alternate plans...have been
studied to determine the facilities and costs necessary to elim-
inate dependence on export from Bandar Mah Shahr t omeet assumed
capacity targets after the third quarter of 1969."1
Basically the difference between the Original and Principal plans
involved the years 1969 through 1971. Total capacity was to grow over
the whole period from 3.297 mbd to 4.277 mbd in both plans, but in the
middle period heavy export growth was slightly advanced at the expense
of light export in the Principal Plan. "(T)his shift in emphasis from
Light to Heavy export crude capacity development requires major realign-
ment of plans for the addition of field facilities, main oil lines,
boosters, and NGL plants."ll
9Plan, April, 1968, p. 34. Four months later, the original olaonwas selected.
OIbid., p. 1.
llIbid., p. 3. Recall that it is in this Plan that any further augmentation
of-eavy capacity is said to require the expensive development of Ahwaz
and Rag-e-Safid.
- 67 -
Capital costs for the Original and Principal Plans (including
those for field facilities, flowlines, wells, boosters, and MOL's but
excluding NGL and Kharg terminal expenditures may be summarized as
follows (from Figure 10):
Plan April, 1968
1968 1969 1970 1971 Average
Original
'000 bd +444 +245 +178 +268 +284
i/b/d 26.1 28.4 68.9 21.9 32.3
Principal
'000 bd +444 +230 +113 +348 +284
L/b/d 26.1 21.0 46.6 43.1 32.3
By the Plan of August, 1968, however, the development planned for
the years 1969 through 1971 was exactly the same as the Original Plan
of April of that year: capacity of 3.542 mbd in 1969 and of 4.003 mbd
in 1971, or a capacity growth of about 460 TBD, equally divided between
light and heavy.
For these years, Marun, Gachsaran and Bibi Hakimeh were to provide
the growth. The report suggests that there will be a slight excess in
heavy export capacity in 1969 "created by the need to expand heavy crude
facilities to meet assumed targets for the following year."12
While no discounted value of expenditures is presented in the
August, 1968 report, it is useful to compare the annual changes in
12
Plan, August, 1968, p. 3.
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in capacity and of capital coefficients of August with those of April:
Plans August and April, 1968
1969 1970 1971 Average
August, 1968
'000 bd +245 +178 +268 +230
h/b/d 26.9 66.6 27.6 37.4
April, 1968
'000 bd +245 +178 +268 +230
6/b/d 28.4 68.9 21.9 39.7
The August report points out that about half the high capital costs of
1970 result from the installation of the fifth sealine; without the
sealine capital costs would be 29.1 per bd.1 3
1969 was a year for three capacity reports. In the first of these
of February, five alternative plans are presented and "present value
profiles" compared covering the period 1970-1972, but forecasting as
well through 1979 for a 7% annual growth rate. At a discount rate of
25%X, the Preferential Light Plan was the least cost and the most favor-
able one, but the recommendation of the report is for the Principal Plan,
because of certain other advantages such as idl.e well capacity in some
areas to be better utilized in the Principal Plan, better well productivity,
better use of MOL capacity. The Principal Plan called for light development
in KaranJ-Paris followed by Marun, with heavy development of Ahwaz from
13 Ibid., p. 11.
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1971 to 1976, then Rag-e-Safid and Kilur Karim to provide additional
heavy capacity through 1979. The Preferential Light Plan called for
the development of Marun followed by Karanj-Paris through 1975, with
the beginning of development of Ahwaz, Rag-e-Safid, and Kilur Karim
deferred until 1976. In both cases, total capacity was to rise from
3.861 mbd in 1970 to 4.3 mbd in 1972 to 6.992 mbd in 1980. In the years
from 1971 through 1976, the Preferential Light Plan resulted in light
export about twice the size of heavy export (given the deferment of
Ahwaz), while the Principal Plan adhered to a 57% light and 43% heavy
export division.
Capital-costs of the Principal Plan for new capacity are as follows:
Principal Plan February, 1969
1970 1971 1972 Average
'000 bd +122 +254 +259 +212
6/b/d 22.7 63.7 40.9 46.5
Costs are high in 1971 because of the Ahwaz-Gurreh MOL (9 million).l4
The average cost for the three year period would be 39.6 per bd without
the inclusion of NGL costs, and 25.5 per bd excluding both NGL and
Ahwaz MOL costs. 5
In March of 1969, however, another report with present value pro-
files at 25% was presented covering the same period 1970-1972. The
14 This line of 153 miles of 42-48" line was completed in 1972. In the same
year Rag-e-Safid's MOL for export was also completed.
1 5Plan, February, 1969, p. 12.
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Principal Plan was revised by 200 TBD additional light in 1970; the Pre-
ferential Light was revised by developing Karanj-Paris ahead of Marun un-
til 1975, with no planned variation in heavy development thereafter. The
Revised Preferential Light Plan now is the least cost alternative discounted
at 25% (note that the Ahwaz-Gurreh MOL at+9 million is eliminated). This
March report quotes discounted capital coefficients: the per barrel cost of
the Revised Preferential Light Plan are 4+26.99 for 265 TBD in 1970,-3.22
for 50 TBD in 1971, and 4t5.90 for 250 in 1972.
In June of 1969, a third plan surveys capacity development in the 1970-
1972 period. Total capacity is placed at 4.079 mbd in 1970 and at 4.739
mbd in 1972 (see the respective figures of 4.079 and 4.314 mbd from the
March plan). Light export capacity is revised preferentially again, al-
though heavy capacity is unchanged from the March plan. Light is to grow
by 425 TBD in 1971 (by 88 TBD in that year from the March plan) and again by
194 TBD in 1972 (by 107 TBD from the March plan). No capital costs per
barrel, nor any use of discounting appears in this presentation; it is
probably safe to conclude that these revisions for further preferential
light development continued to be the low cost choice at that time.
By August 1970, plans call for more emphasis on heavy export during the
years 1971-1975: "(T) the emphasis on Heavy export development results in a
marked change in the percentage of Heavy crude in the total export stream
which increases from 37.1% in 1971 to 46.7% in 1975.16 Ahwaz in this re-
port is slated for a 550-TBD increase in 1972 together with a 100-TBD in-
crease at the same time from Rag-e-Safid. By hindsight, we can only say that
16Plan, August, 1970, p. 6. Similar percentages for heavy export from the
March plan are from 40 to 37.6% during the same period.
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the Preferential Light Plans of 1969 have been again revised, to bring Ahwaz
on in 1972 rather than 1976. The Principal Plan of February 1969 had called
for Ahwaz development to commence in 1970, but the attempt was always to
defer expenditures on the necessary MOL. In fact, the 1970 report states
that in "1972 preferential Heavy capacity development is commenced."l 7
The 1972 plan called for expansion in Ahwaz from 272 in 1971 to 409 in 1972
to 822 TBD in 1973, to rise in the next two years to 877 and 987 TBD, respec-
tively (actual first half outputs in 1972 and 1973 were, respectively, 281
and 817 TBD). But nowhere in this plan are presented any analyses.of alter-
natives'on a discounted basis, or on at/b/d basis.
By June 1971 we have capacity plans from 1972 to 1976, but again no
present value profiles. Capacity for 1972 has by'this time been revised up-
ward to 4.907 mbd, to reach 6.4 mbd by 1976 (tentative). An average capacity
increase per year of about 370 TBD was planned, but now with the percent of
light export in the range of 61-55%. Ahwaz estimates are unchanged from the
previous plan through 1973, but thereafter Ahwaz is to rise to 987 in 1974
(not 877 TBD) and to remain at that rate through 1976. Heavy export capacity
ranges from 38-47% during this period. Our own calculations suggest the
following changes in capacity and relevant capital coefficients for production
facilities:
Capital Plan 'June, 1971
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
'000 bd +353 +783 +455 +455 +487
-t/b/d 42.72 12.46 17.46 17.79 21.82
17 Ibid., p. 9.
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Development drilling was expected to contribute almost 4 mbd to output over
the whole period at an average unit cost of- 16.87 per bd.18
Again in October, 1972 we have no present value profiles, but we do find
that the capital cost of new capacity over the 1973-1975 period is+99.6
per bd, but falls to-t57.3 per bd if maintained capacity is included as well.1 9
Heavy export capacity is now planned at roughly 44% of a total export capacity
of 5.0 mbd in 1973 and of 6.0 mbd in 1975. Rag-e-Safid, Ahwaz and Bibi Hakimeh
are to provide heavy increase while Karanj and Marun continue to supply light
growth.
The last forecast of September 1973 follows the approach of most of its
predecessors by applying no discount factor to its expenditure plans through
1978. It is this plan (estimated at 1974 cost levels) which calls for capa-
city to rise from 5.8 mbd in 1974 to 8.0 mbd in 1977 and 1978, with capacity
goals exactly equal to those set in the 1972 forecast for the years 1974 and
1975. Our capital coefficients are as follows:
Capital Plan September 1973
1974 1975 1976 1977 Average
'000 bd +600 +1220 +110 +165 +524
t/b/d 95.57 57.25 201.57 78.88 77.2
Costs are particularly high in 1976 for desalination facilities for all fields
t9.6 million) as well as for 121 km of 12-inch MOL's for Pazanan, Garangan,
and Dehluran-Chashmeh Khush (totaling-tl.415 million).2 0 Without these in-
clusions, capital costs for the year 1976 would fall by half.
18 Plan, June, 1971, p. 58.
1 9Plan, October 1972, pp. 81-82.
2 0Plan, September, 1973, p. 84.
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V. Average Programmed Quantity, Excess Capacity, and Growth Rates
There has been a feeling in some quarters that throughout the last
decade there existed large amounts of surplus producing capacity in the
Consortium fields. Such excess capacity presumably refers to the diff-
erence between daily output at any time and the ability to produce out-
put from the already installed gathering lines, pumps, wells, and other
field facilities, and main oil line systems. The belief in excess capacity
is frequently expanded to allege that the Consortium failed to develop
additional capacity as fast as it "ought to have," or worse yet, actively
restricted capacity development by its adherence to the Average Programmed
Quantity (A.P.Q.) method of deciding output.
Our reading of the available Look-Ahead and Capital Development Plans
does not support this view.
Average Programmed Quantity
Over the twenty-year period 1954-1974, oil output from Consortium
fields rose at a yearly rate of more than 13% per year. Whether this rate
should be considered relatively high or low is difficult to say. But what
Is of importance is that output was determined according to the A.P.Q.
system. Any support of the conspiratorial theory of "too slow" capacity
development has to derive all its support from the operation of the A.P.Q.
method in setting output.
- 74 -
According to this system, each of the partners in-the Consortium
nominated what total Consortium output.should be the next year, on a daily
barrel basis. These nominations were, of course, based on each partici-
pant's view of next year's demand, given some notion of: stable or rising
price, together with past contracts covering future delivery, and any
alternative sources of crude available on better terms. No one such nom-
ination could be larger than current capacity. In the words of a former
Consortium official, E. L. Shafer:
"The Holding Company would divide each individual nomination
by the equity percentage of the nominator to determine
.the total program which would be required in order to allow.
the nominator to lift his equity percentage and receive
his nomination. The total program figures derived from each
nomination were then listed in descending order of magnitude.
The total program figure of the Participant whose listing
fell at or above a cumulative otal of 70 percent of equity
percentages became the A.P.Q.-
By way of example, we see in the table below that the nom-
ination of Mobil of 5068 TBD for 1973 brought the cumulative total to 72%,
and thus set A.P.Q. at 5068 TBD, with Mobil allowed to lift at tax-paid
cost 7% of this A.P.Q.2
Table I
Participant Share Cumulative 1973 Total
% % ('000 bd)
Gulf 7 7 5428
Iricon 5 12 5342
CFP 6 18 5297
Exxon 7 25 5250
BP 40 65 5137
Mobil 7 72 5068
1Statement of E. L. Shafer before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations, March 28, 1974, p. 6.
2Penalties applied to both underlifting and overlifting.
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This A.P.Q. figure was to set the basis for 1973 liftings, but could
be revised. Actual Consortium output for the year 1973 amounted to 5427
TBD, or about 7% more than the A.P.Q. figure. Note that the largest nom-
ination was about 8% higher than A.P.Q., less than 2% above actual output
for that year, We have the Consortium's own estimate of 1973 capacity of
5584 TBD. No nomination could be larger than that amount for the year
1973, but Gulf's was almost equal to it.
Shafer goes on to say:
"The system has always produced an A.P.Q. below the estimated
capacity, since at no time did 70 percent of the Participants
nominate volumes which would represent their full equity
percentage of available capacity."
But the question is how A.P.Q. nominations were related to the def-
inition of current and future capacity targets, and to actual output as
well. There was no evident link in the A.P.Q. system either to force the
expansion of capacity or to prevent it from expanding at all, i.e., there
was nothing to prevent the Consortium from holding capacity steady at,
say, 4000 TBD for several years running, since no nomination could be
larger than current capacity.
In Table II below, we examine capacity targets, A.P.Q. levels,
highest nominations, and actual outputs since 1964 in an attempt to estab-
lish whether the A.P.Q. system actually did restrain capacity development.
In all cases, actual output exceeded A.P.Q., and exceeded' the highest
nomination in all but one year from 1967 on. Targeted capacity is well
3Shafer, op. cit., p. 6.
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above both A.P.Q. and output in the late 1960's, due to the changes in
plans for future development. But the fact that in the years since 1969
the target has averaged only 7.2% more than actual output does not suggest
anything more than the normal cushion (for the Consortium itself suggests
a margin of about 10% excess capacity for usual operations).
It is impossible, therefore, to conclude that the' A.P.Q. method
has been a strong force in restricting capacity development. In fact,
there appears to be no systematic connection between the A.P.Q. levels
and the capacity targets; further, actual output has for some time been
about the same as the highest nomination.
Evidence of Surplus Capacity from Consortium Documents
The development plan of 1964 surveyed the future to 1969. No net
expansion was to occur in 1967, but the annual expansion in each of the
other four years was to average about 130 TBD. The company stated that
post-1969 capacity requirements, however defined, could prohably be met
without any new fields for some years, "depending upon the rate of growth,"
from such fields as Marun, Karanj, Bibi Hakimeh, and Kharg.4 These fields
were about to be developed at that time, but contained as yet no idle or
excess capacity.
By the 1965 plan, however, the company expected expansion in capacity
to rise at a rate of 150 TBD each year through 1970. Beyond the end of
1966, expansion of Gachsaran would entail the installation of pumps at the
Gurreh booster station.
4Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Production Capacity, 1965-1969 (June, 1965),
Appendix II-2.
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From the 1966 plan, we find that capacity is expected to grow at about
150 TBD in each of the years through 1971. "Capacity additions which were
required to meet the 1967 capacity target will cause the 1968 capacity to
exceed' the assumed target by 110 MB/D, but close adherence to all target
figures is maintained thereafter."5 This is the first admission of any
surplus capacity, even on a temporary basis.
The 1968-1972 period is the subject of many forecasts and revisions,
and in each of these there appears temporary excess capacity in the early
portion of the period. Most of this is attributable to the development of
heavy capacity at the time that plans were beginning to stress preferential
light development (see Table III).
In Plan A of February,.1967, capacity is to rise about 335 TBD annually
from 1968 through 1970.
"(N)o additions to Heavy export occur during 1968, since
Heavy capacity installed during 1967 is sufficient to exceed
* 1968 requirements and to match the 1969 target.... The only
major departure from target occurs in 1968, when Heavy export
and, in consequence, total capacity developed, exceeds the
target by 170,000 and 163,000 B/D respectively.. This results
primarily from the installation in 1967 of 125,000 BID
capacity at Production Unit No. 2 in Bibi Hakimeh, which per-
mits meeting the Heavy export target capacity in 1967. The
surplus of Heavy capacity in 1968 is regarded as insurance
that capacity would be available to meet the total crude
export target, even if there were delays in the commissioning
of facilities whose timing is critical in meeting the Light
capacity targets for that year. In any case, this Heavy
capacity is required to meet the 1969 targets.
While temporary excess heavy capacity is at that time expected to be
5Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Production Capacity, 1967-1971 (June, 1966), p. 2.
6 Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Capacity Development, 1967-1970 (February, 1967),
pp. 3-4. It should be recalled that the Plans of 1967 were the first to
begin the stress on preferential light export development.
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as great as 163 TBD, it is primarily the result .of the lumpiness of the
investment process associated with meeting 1967 targets.
The August, 1967 forecast covers the period 1968 through 1972; the
targets of 1971 and 1972 were to be achieved by a total capacity growth
of 350 TBD per year. Again the developed capacity was expected to exceed
the target in the first three years of the period because of the shift in
light and heavy targets.7
The Principal Plan of April, 1968, however, indicated a shortfall of
developed capacity for 1968 of 21 TBD. Less than a year before surplus
capacity for 1968 had been estimated at 116 TBD. By 1969, this report
expected that there would be 91 TBD of excess light capacity coupled with a
28-TBD deficiency in heavy, such that the total excess capacity figure for
that year is 63 TBD. Clearly the excess heavy capacity was a temporary
phenomenon of 1968-1969. It was this year's presentations which warned
that because of the expense of developing the costly heavy fields of Ahwaz
and Rag-e-Safid, "it was considered prudent to accept a small deficiency
of developed Heavy capacity in 1971." 8
The August, 1968 Plan represents the final plan covering capacity
development during the years 1969-1971, and called for an average annual
capacity increase of about 150 TBD. At this time again, we find that there
will be temporary developed heavy export surplus capacity of 51 TBD in 1969
in anticipation for 1970 production plans.9
7
7Crude Production Capacity Development Plans 1968-1970 Showing Alternative
Developments for 71 and 1972-(.ugust, 1967), p. 4. -
8Alternative Plans for Crude Oil Capacity Development 1968-1972 (April,
1968), p. . ..
9Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Oil Production Capacity Development 1969-1971
(August, 1968), p. 3 and Appendix A-2.
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In the 1969 plans, any temporary amounts of excess capacity are due
largely to the rapid development of light capacity beginning in 1970 and
carrying over into 1971 and 1972. We find that since light export capacity
is 39 TBD greater in 1970 than target total capacity, total capacity ex-
ceeds target by exactly that amount. The excess of 147 TBD foreseen for
1971 in the March, 1969 plan was again only the result of the preferential
development of light capacity, and disappears almost entirely the following
year.
The l.ast two forecasts also show expected excess capacity, but only
in the range from 117 TBD to 275 TBD. The 1973 report explains succinctly:
"It is seen that the capacities developed...are greater-than
the amount required, such that a cumulative surplus of developed
capacity in respect to requirements occurs and increases during
each year of the Plan. The surplus occurs for two reasons:- first,
it is not possible to exactly tailor the capacity additions to meet
the requirements because of the necessity of dealing with practical
· ncrements of separator capacity; second, it is necessary to
develop capacity surplus to the initial fourth quarter requirement
to avoid falling below the capacity goal as a result of decline of
older fields during the remaining three quartejy of the one-year
period over which the capacity goal prevails." .
Conclusion
What is eminently clear from this survey of the capital plans is that
capacity programs were carefully formed and meticulous efforts were under-
taken to fulfill them. When installed capacity was expected to be greater than
target capacity, then generally only a temnorary surplus arose in the early years.
In the later years, an excess of from 100 to 200 TBD can only be considered
the bare minimum cushion for production.
l°Capital Development Plan and Program 1974-1978 (September, 1973), p. 14.
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VI. Growth: Past and Future
Over the whole period 1964-1974, Consortium output grew at an annual
rate of just over 13 percent. In February and March of 1969, the Capital
Plans projected a 7 percent growth rate through 1970. According to those
earlier projections, the Consortium would not have met the target capacity
capable of producing its actual 1974 output until sometime during 1977.
In 1973 total net crude capacity forecast for 1974 was 5995 TBD, while
actual 1974 output was 5577 TBD, equal to 93 percent of forecast capacity.
Growth rates in the various individual fields differed widely, however,
during that decade, as seen below. Of the fields listed, all were producing
in 1974, but only Agha Jari, Ahwaz, Gachsaran, Masjid-i-Sulaiman, and
Naft Safid were producing in 1964.
Table I
Annual Growth Rate in Iranian Consortium Fields, 1964 - 1974
Consortium 13.1 %
Agha Jari 1.9
Ahwaz 17.7
Bibi Hakimeh 25.4
Gachsaran 7.4
Karanj 18.9
Kharg 24.4
Kupal 53.8
Marun 40.9
Masjid-i-Sulaiman - 17.5
Naft Safid 5.4
Paris 59.1
Pazanan - 13.2
Ramshir 18.1
Rag-e-Safid 40.0
Btnak 20.5
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But future growth is difficult to forecast. Nor can we know how
much additional output will be forthcoming in any particular time period.
As a proxy for growth, we use both exploration and development drilling
efforts, implicitly assuming that there must be about a three-year lag
between the stepping up of exploratory activity and the beginning of
test development of new prospects. Thereafter one needs to add probably
another two years before newly found prospects are developed and equipped
for commercial production.l The 1970 projection saw very little undeveloped
capacity by 1975.
In the plans of 1964 to 1966, two strings were to be used for explor-
ation in each year through 1971. From those same plans, we find four
strings scheduled for development drilling each year through 1967, dropping
thereafter to three strings ayear through 1971.
Little reference s made to drilling strings in the following plans
until 1969. In the forecasts of 1969, 1970, and 1971, three strings were
expected to be utilized annually in exploratory drilling through 1976.
From the first two of those plans, development drilling is planned at five
strings for 1970 and four strings for both 1971 and 1972. The 1971 plan,
however, revises 1972 development strings upward to 6.35.
The last three forecasts of 1971, 1972, and 1973 suggest a massive
increase in planned drilling activity, and are summarized in Table II below.
Table III gives the actual number of strings active in both types of
drilling activity through 1972.2
1These time periods are based on the pattern for Lab-e-Safid, discovered in
1969 and commencing production in 1974. The time involved for other fields
has been both longer and shorter.
2 No 1973 Annual Report was issued by the National Iranian Oil Company; that
for 1974 is not yet available.
Table II
Iranian Strings Planned for Exploratory Drilling (ED), Developmental
Drilling (DD), and Fluid Injection Drilling (FD)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
6/1971
ED 3 3 3 3 3
DD 6.4 8 7 7 9
4.5 5 5
13 14 14
5
21.6
6
24.6
6
26.7
6
15.6
6
16.4
1.2 7.4 5.3 9.4 8.0
Table III
Iranian Strings
Exploratory
2.7
1.5
1.4
1.9
3.4
2.4
3.1
3.0
3.2
Engaged in Exploratory and Development
Drilling
Development
3
2.7
2.2
4.0
4.8
4.5
4.8
4.2
7.4
10/1972
ED
DD
9/1973
ED
DD
FD
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
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When we compare the planned versus the actual utilization of drilling
strings, we find that in the 1964-1966 period, the company engaged in less
drilling activity of both kinds than anticipated. The actual pattern of
behavior is much closer to that planned in the years 1969 through 1971, al-
though the number of strings engaged in development drilling in 1972 was
higher than even the revised figure for that year. On the basis of these
drilling plans and those of the final three forecasts, we should expect
continued growth in onshore capacity and production potential, although
continuation at an annual rate of more than 13 percent is considered un-
likely (see Appendix I-B), Rig-day drilling costs, however, have shown a
steep rise in the last few years. We expect capacity to rise to a main-
tainable level of production of over 7000 TBD in the next several years.
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APPENDIX I: POTENTIAL OF NEW AND OLD FIELDS
A. New Fields
Of all the new fields discussed below, only Kupal, Mansuri, and
Lab-e Safid have actually begun production (Kupal in 1972 and the others
in 1974). Most of the very small rates of projected output in the early
years of a planning period result from new field test wells, and it is
only later as main oil lines (MOLs) and production units are installed
that output rises to higher levels.
The major portion of this section deals with new fields for which
development plans were made in at least some of the forecasts. There
are two additional fields discovered and indicated on OSCO area maps,
but as yet OSCO reports no capacity development plans.l
As early as the forecast issued in 1966, new field prospects
were under discussion. Kupal is the first (June, 1966), with Kilur
Karim entering in the April, 1968 forecast. Both were to be producers
of heavy oil, and output from each (according to our most recent pro-
jection of 1973) was to rise from 20 TBD in 1974 to 176 TBD in 1978.
Only Kupal has produced any oil to date.
In the January and March, 1969, forecasts, the new fields of Lab-e
Safid, Maleh Kuh (the latter generally associated with Sarkan in later
reports), Ab-e-Teymur, Chashmeh Khush, and Ramin were introduced.
1These fields are Danan and Kabud. There is in addition a series of
other "new fields" which appear only on the OSCO area map and are never
introduced into the future drilling program at all, such as Halush,
Karun, Susangard, Dorquain, Shadegan, and Gulkhari.
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All of these fields lie north and/or west of Ahwaz and contain heavy
oil. While they still need to be connected to the main pipeline system,
they were considered in 1968 to constitute a possible source of addi-
tional heavy oil so as to offset the declining Central Area fields.
They were also termed candidates for development as alternatives to
Ahwaz expansion to supply the Abadan and Tehran refineries.
The most promising of the fields from the 1969 data2 was Lab-e
Safid. Discovered in 1969, it contains light oil. It was expected to
commence production in 1971 at 20 TBD, rise to 40 TBD in 1977, to 125
TBD in 1'978, and to reach 200 TBD in 1979 and 1980. In 1970, Lab-e
Safid was to have an output of 30 TBD in each of the years 1972 through
1975, or an increase of 50 per cent over the earlier evaluation. The
1971 forecast reduces expected output from 30 TBD to 17 TBD for the
year 1972, but otherwise offers no change, with output to remain at 30
TBD through 1976. The 1972 report again carries 30 TBD for the years
1973 through 1975. In the 1973 plan, however, we find Lab-e Safid output
planned at 30 TBD for 1974 and 1975, then rising to 110 TBD for each of
the years through 1978. Actual output in 1974 was 22 TBD, coming from
two wells. It appears that the output of 30 TBD or less is attributable
to one or two delineation and observation wells. But clearly the recent
projection of 110 TBD is far below the optimistic range of 125-200 TBD
made in the 1969 forecasts. One of the major constraints on output
prior to 1974 was the absence of an MOL to carry'oil to the existing
pipeline network; in the American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bull-
etin, October, 1973 this line was reported under construction as of
year-end, 1972.
2The forecasts of that year were the Preferential Light Plan and the
Revised Preferential Light Plan'.
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The 1970 forecast dealt with all of the fields listed in the 1969
plan, but added Mansuri (discovered in 1963). Both Lab-e Safid and Mansuri
lie at 8600 feet, slightly shallower than Ahwaz-Asmari at 9000 feet.
Mansuri was expected to commence output at 10 TBD in 1974 and 1975. This
rate was revised down to 3 TBD for 1973 in the 1971 report, and then
carried at 10 TBD from 1974 to 1976. Mansuri is not shown in the 1972
plan, but in the 1973 forecast, it appears as producing 20 TBD in 1974
and 1975, 42 TBD in 1976, and 110 TBD in both 1977 and 1978. Output did
commence in 1974, at a rate of 5 TBD from one well.
Sulabedar,' Garangan, and'Dehluran appear n the list of new fields,
together with those already named, in the 1973 forecast. The first two
fields are located at the sourthern end of the OSCO area, and are likely to
be relatively easy to feed into the pipeline network of Bibi Hakimeh and
Gachsaran for Kharg export, given sufficient booster power. They lie
close to developed fields, and may possibly exhibit the same gravity
characteristics of Bibi Hakimeh. Dehluran, however, is located in the north,
and is far from any developed field or pipeline..
Sulabedar was carried at 20 TBD in 1974, 42 TBD in 1975, and 110,
124, and 176 TBD in each of the last three years of the planning period.
Garangan was to commence at 4 TBD in 1974, and rise only to 55 TBD in
both 1977 and 1978. Dehluran was not slated to begin production until
1976 (14 TBD), and rise to only 55 TBD in each of the last two years.
Clearly these latter two fields are not expected to increase output
significantly in the years ahead.
Returning to the fields discussed in the earlier forecasts, Sarkan-
Maleh Kuh were expected in 1969 to produce 2 TBD in 1974, rising to 40 TBD
in 1978 through 1980. By the 1970 report, these fields were carried at 25 TBD
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through 1975. In 1971, their output was reduced to 20 TBD from 1974 through
1976. The 1972 plan omits these fields, but the 1973 forecast indicated 1976
output of 27 TBD in 1976, and then a major increase to 110 TBD in both 1977
and 1978. No mention is made of necessary MOLs to bring these fields on
stream, but it is a good guess that the rate of 110 TBD will only be opera-
tional after such construction.
Chashmeh Khush, not too far from Sarkan-Maleh Kuh, was scheduled in
the 1969 plans to begin output in 1975 at 5 TBD, rise to 20 TBD in 1976 and
1977, to 43 TBD in 1978, and to reach 110 TBD in 1979 and 1980. By the
August 1970 plan, it was carried at 20 TBD in both 1974 and 1975, and con-
tinued at 20 TBD in 1976 (from the 1971 report). Omitted from the 1972
forecast, it appears again in the 1973 plan, carried at exactly the same figures
as Sarkan-Maleh Kuh: 27 TBD in 1976, and 110 TBD in 1977 and 1978. While
MOL construction does not require simultaneous laying of pipe, these two
fields are expected to be brought on stream together.
Ab-Teymur, however, is most optimistically forecast in the 1969 plans
to reach 70 TBD in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Output was expected to begin at 8 TBD
in 1974. But in the 1973 plan, Ab-Teymur begins production only in 1977 at
12 TBD, and rises to 50 TBD in 1978.
Ramin (earlier called Mulla Sani) was in 1969 expected to begin produc-
tion at 5 TBD in 1974, and like Ab-Teymur, to reach 70 TBD in each year
1978-1980. In the plans of 1970, 1971, and 1972, it is expected to begin pro-
duction at 25 TBD in 1973 (moved up in time) and to produce 38 TBD in 1975.
But in the most recent plan, the field begins at 12 TBD in 1977 and is listed
at 50 TBD for 1978.
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But two real mystcr ies are Kilur Karim and Kupal. The first, ac-
cording to 1969 plans, was to begin production that year at 5 TBD, reach
20 TBD from 1970 through 1977, 65 TBD in 1978, and 200 TBD in 1979 and 1980.
In all plans after those dates, except for the one of 1973, KilurKarim does
not appear. As stated at the beginning of this section, the 1973 forecast
carries a revised output of 20 TBD in 1974 up to 176 TBD in 1978. To our know-
ledge production has yet to begin.
Discovered in 1965, Kupal was expected to begin production in 1971,
according to the 1970 plan, at 15 TBD and remain at that rate through 1975.
But Kupal is deep at 14,000 feet and had only two wells through 1974. By
the 1971 plan, output would stay at 15 TBD through 1975 (beginning, however,
in 1972 rather than 1971), and then rise to 65 TBD in 1976. In the 1972
forecast, Kupal capacity is carried at 20 TBD in 1973 and 1974, and at 29
TBD in 1975. Finally, in the last plan, capacity is again listed at 20 TBD
for 1974, revised upward to 42 TBD for 1975, and then rises to 110, 124,
and 176, respectively, in each of the last three years of the planning
period. Actual productivity per well was 1 TBD in 1972, 8 TBD in 1973,
and 10.5 TBD in 1974. Output did begin in 1972, and the 1974 rate of 21 TBD
closely matches the 1973 forecast for 1974.
One might expect that the developmental drilling program in the latest
forecast of 1973 would call for development in Sarkan-Maleh Kuh-Chashmeh
Khush, Mansuri, Kupal, and Lab-e Safid, for these were the fields expected
to reach 110 TBD in the period 1976-1978.
Sarkan is to have two wells developed in 1974 and six in 1975, with a
50 TBD change in capacity appearing in 1975. In 1976, six more wells
are to be completed for another capacity increment of 60 TBD, while no
developmenlal drilling is scheduled for 1977 and 1978. Drilling in Sarkan is
estimated from this program at 3 per bd in 1974 and -12 per bd in 1975.
- 92 -
Chashmeh Khush is to have two development wells completed in both 1974 and
1975, generating a 30-TBD increment in capacity in 1975. Four wells were
planned for 1977 with a change in capacity for the field in that year of 60
TBD. No development was planned for 1977, while in 1978 one well completion
was planned to add 14 TBD to capacity. Drilling costs here are placed at 9
per bd in 1975 and t1l6 in 1976, and at 5 per bd in 1978. While these dril-
ling plans are consistent with planned production for those years, it
should be pointed out that these fields' well productivity is substantially
less than those of already developed fields (20 TBD average).
Mansuri has both an Asmari and a Bangestan pool, and drilling plans
through 1978 call for two well completions in the B zone in 1974 with no
change in capacity, four completions in 1975 in the A zone with a 30-TBD in-
crement in capacity (L5 per bd for drilling), one completion in A and six in
B in 1976 for a 10-TBD and a 60-TBD change in capacity, respectively. Dril-
ling costs are estimated at only t1 per bd in A, but at 9 per bd in the B
zone. No drilling plans in either zone were planned at the time of the
forecast for 1977, but one well is to be completed in the B zone in 1978 for
9 TBD (16 per bd for drilling). Well productivity is expected to be 10 TBD
or less, far lower than in the older fields. The one well currently opera-
ting is producing at the rate of 5 TBD. The capacity generated here totals
100 TBD, while output is scheduled for 110 TBD in both 1977 and 1978.
Kupal has both the A and B zones also. Two wells were to be completed
in 1974 in the A zone with no change in capacity, while in 1975 five in A
and four in B were planned, to result in +56 TBD capacity in A and +40 TBD in B.
No activity in either zone appears for 1976 but in 1977 two more wells in A
and four more in B are expected to generate an additional 26 TBD in A and an
additional 48 TBD in B. For 1978 only B is to have additional completions, with
four more wells expected to result in +36 TBD. Drilling cost estimates suggest
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Kupal is a very high cost field: t13 - t25 for A and from t31 to 469 in B.
Here again the well productivity figures are approximately half the cur-
rent ones. Without allowing for decline, these wells would all together
result in productive capacity of about 200 TBD, while production was scheduled
at 176 TBD for 1978.
Lab-e Safid is clearly expected to have the most productive wells, ac-
cording to the drilling program. Two were to be completed in 1974, and six
in 1975 for a capacity gain of 95 TBD occurring in 1975, thus generating per-
well productivity of 11.9 TBD. (Rach of the two wells newly operating in
1974 produced at a rate of 11 TBD). No plans are given for further completions
in either 1976 or 1978, but one well with a capacity of 17 TBD is planned for
1977. Yet even here well productivity is far below those currently prevailing
in other fields. Developmental drilling costs can be calculated at 7 per bd
in 1975 and at t2 per bd in 1977, the lowest of any considered above.
Start-up costs are high in bringing any new field on stream, but the
estimates of very high drilling costs at great depth in Kupal versus those
of Lab-e Safid may be the prime reason that the latter is producing currently
and the former is not. It shoud also be noted that Kupal is much closer to
established pipelines than was Lab-e Safid.
The final question of interest to us concerning new fields is their ul-
timate physical productivity. While the earlier forecasts seem overly op-
timistic concerning both capacity and its time of introduction, the 1973
forecast is no doubt the most reliable. By 1976, we may have even more
output from Lab-e Safid than the planned 110 TBD, for that amount is generated
by the installation of only the initial size production unit. The 1973 plan
calls for 355 TBD more than in the two preceding years (which in turn were
to have added 74 TBD and 127 TBD). One expectation is that if 1976 output
from all fields is higher than 1973 output by over 500 TBD, it will not arise
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from the exploitation of the new fields but rather from the maintenance through
gas and water injection of some of the larger, older, and more developed
fields. The sum of the planned capacity additions in new fields over the
five-year period to 1978 is over 2 mbd, yet the press reports are quiet on
new field activity these days; rather they are full of plans for capacity
maintenance in the older and more prolific fields.
B. Response to OSCO field capacity estimates as shown in document from
Senate MNC Subcommittee entitled "Probable Maximum 1972/73 Production of
Iranian Consortium Fields"
None of the estimates contained in the document cited above come from
the most recent forecast of fall, 1973. No doubt there is a fall, 1974
forecast as well, but it is currently unavailable to us. The author of the
document has made a very crucial error by suggesting that ultimate capacity
targets represent current (i.e. , 1972/73) production capabilities. Capa-
city build-ups occur gradually, and dates must be used for the planned achieve-
ment of the ultimate capacity goal.
The author has also erred by relying on forecasts made in 1964, 1965, and
1966. Below is a table giving Capacity Potential as found in the 1965 fore-
cast. The far right column contains the ultimate capacity targets for the
same fields as found in the 1973 forecast to 1978. One need compare only the
second column with the last column to see how the passage of time has caused
the estimates on capacity to change. (See Table A-I).
In the sections which follow, we proceed in the same manner as did the
author of the document.
I. FIELDS WHOSE MAXIMUM
BEEN APPROACHED (see
Pazanan (1961)
Bibi Hakimeh (1961)
Kharg (1962)
SUSTAINED ALLOWABLE RATE (MAR) HAS NOT
Look-ahead-Plans, June 1964):
150 TBD
600 TBD
150 TBD
900 TBD First half 1974 q: 462 TBD
TABLE A-I
Iranian Fields' Capacity Potential-
(1)
MAR
Ahwaz
(Asmari)
Agha Jari
Gachsaran
Pazanan
Bibi Hakimeh
Kharg
KaranJ
Marun
Paris
Rag-e Safid
Ramshir
500
850
700
175
550
150
450
500
135
155
1-0
(2)
UPMC*
600
1000
800
200
650
175
550
600
300
250
(3)
Planned
For 1969
200
960
670
64
190
20
40
240
20
(4)
Capacity
For 1970
288
809
795
43
340
20
55
225
25
50
20
(5)
1974
Output.
873 ·
1010
912
34
369
66
316
1054
423
313
19
(6)
Ultimate Capacity
from 1973 forecast
1207
1045
1050
126
377
136
300
1710
445
345
50
All data in thousand barrels daily
MAR: Maximum sustained allowable rate
*UPMC: ultimate probable maximum capacity
The first four columns of data are from the 1965 Capital Plan
Development Program; the last column on the right is from the
item of similar name.
d -
and
1973
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The figures on the preceding page, rather than those in the document,
are correct as of that date, but those estimates were carefully hedged at
the time since the fields were relatively new. Projected capacity has been
revised downward substantially since then. It is thus not accurate to count
on those three fields for 900 TBD in five years' time, let alone as operating
or producing that amount in 1972/73. These early guesses at field potential
do not signify existing excess capacity.
The 1964 and 1965 Plans said that Pazanan needed further appraisal
due to coning problems. Difficult drilling conditions were expected to
postpone development (Pazanan lies at 9000 feet). There was great doubt that
well-potentials of 20 TBD would be forthcoming. While two wells were added
in both 1973 and 1974 (only two were producing in 1972), well productivity
in Pazanan is currently very low at 5.7 TBD. Planned capacity was scaled
down to 35 TBD in 1973 for 1974, and the field actually produced 34 TBD in
1974.
Bibi Hakimeh was assigned an MAR of 600 TBD in 1964, but the Plan
pointed out that productivity per well varied and more testing was needed. It
did appear to have 20 TBD well-potentials, distances to pipelines were short,
gravity characteristics were favorable. However, in 1965, we find mention
of some difficulties with flowing wellhead pressure. The 1967 Plan suggested
full development of Bibi Hakimeh would be at 530 TBD, but the laterst plan
sees capacity at 400 TBD or less, even with extensive desalination and injec-
tion facilities. Production peaked at 456 TBD in 1970 and fell to 369 TBD
in 1974.
Kharg, at 11,800 feet, is deep, and from the earliest Plan its MAR
"could be as high as 150,000 BD", but in that same plan Kharg was cited for
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low well productivities (5 TBD), high H2S content, poor oil quality, and
high drilling costs. The same assessment was made again in 1965, with the
decision to keep capacity at only 20 TBD. In 1969 and later Plans, capacity
was gradually revised upward, with a goal of 75 TBD in 1973, 1974, and 1975.
Actual output in 1973 was 75 TBD, but was only 66 TBD in 1974. Each of the
six wells now operating averages 11 TBD, better than the original estimate
of 5 TBD, but about half the OSCO average of 20 TBD per well.
We would thus revise downward the estimates of page one as follows:
Ultimate Capacity
Pazanan 125 TBD
Bibi Hakimeh 400 TBD
Kharg 125 TBD
650 TBD
II. DECLINING CENTRAL FIELDS (see Capital Development, June 1971, October, 1972):
Haft Kel 38 TBD
Masjid-e Suleiman 15 TBD
Naft Safid 34 TBD
Lali 1 TBD
88 TBD First half 1974 q: 109 TBD
The above estimates are those of the document, and are basically correct.
Indeed, they may be slightly understated, for the next forecast in September,
1973 places 1974 capacity of Central Area fields at 98 TBD, this to decline
thereafter to 67 TBD in 1978. The actual output figures for 1974 include Par-e
Siah (often included in the Central Area), producing at 7 TBD.
- 98 -
III. MAJOR FIELDS, PRODUCING AT MAXIMUM PROJECTED CAPACITY (see Capital
Development, June 1971, October 1972):
Document Estimate Ultimate Capacity (MSC)
(TBD) (TBD)
Agha Jari 1045 ?1045 
Gachsaran 940 1050
Ahwaz (Asmari and
Bangestan) 1817 1400 ?
Karanj 600 300
Marun 1860 1710
Paris 680 450
Rag-e Safid 325 345
7267 6300
First half 1974 q: 4984 TBD
Agha Jari was to peak at 1045 TBD in 1974 and 1975 but has never
produced more than 1014.5 TBD (1973). Its output declined in 1974 to 1010
TBD. It is now the candidate for capacity maintenance to arrest its decline
to 762 TBD in 1978. A capacity (maintained) of 1045 TBD is still a possibility.
Gachsaran is also a candidate for major maintenance procedures, with
capacity currently at 940 TBD and 1974 output of 912 TBD. The 1973 forecast
slates Gachsaran for 1050 TBD in 1976-1978.
Ahwaz Asmari and Bangestan must be considered separately, for the
reservoirs and conditions are totallydifferent. The 1973 forecast puts
ultimate target capacity development of Bangestan - as of that date only -
at 750 TBD, and of Asmari at 1207 TBD, for a combined target developed
capacity of 1919 TBD. Bangestan was supposed to be producing at a rate of,
144 TBD in 1974, rising to 712 TBD in 1978, but has been a disappointment
with 1974 production at only 83 TBD. Asmari capacity was slated for 908
TBD in 1974, and the field operated at 96% of capacity or at 873 TBD in 1974.
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The goal of 1207 was te he reached by 1976 and to continue through 1978.
It should be noted that both Ahwaz areas are candidates for injection, but
there is serious doubt that Bangestan will ever reach the 700 TBD rate. Thus
a more likely capacity figure for both fields together might be 1400 TBD rather
than 1919 TBD.
Karanj capacity is clearly overstated in the document estimate in
the preceding list of fields. The capacity of 600 TBD is found in the June,
1971 Plan for the year 1975, in which capacity was to rise to 975. But
plans for 1975 were only tentative, associated with an error of 25%.
A hand has reduced the 975 TBD to 600 TBD, but that is still too high. Since
1971, the newer forecasts have shown that Karanj will have been fully de-
veloped by 1975, at a capacity of 300 TBD. It is this level of capacity
which proposed injection facilities are designed to maintain. Karanj
actually produced at a rate of 316 TBD in 1974.
Paris's future capacity was carried as high as 675 TBD in 1969, and
at 680 TBD in the June, 1971 plan, but later plans have revised it downward
to only 450 TBD. This capacity is expected to be maintained with injection
facilities. Paris produced 423 TBD in 1974, or at 94% of the planned
capacity of 450 TBD for that year.
Rag-e-Safid was assigned a target capacity of 325 TBD in the 1971
Plan (for 1976), but this has been revised both down and up in the following
two plans. In 1972, the target was for 288 TBD in 1975; in 1973, it was
for 345 in 1977 and 1978. The field actually produced 313 TBD in 1974, or
106% of the capacity of 295 planned in 1973 for that year. It is indeed
possible that this field may reach 345 TBD before 1977.
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IV. ADMITTED AND PROBABLY VASTLY UNDERSTATED MINIMUM PRODUCTION OF LESS
ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE FIELDS (see above references and Crude Oil
Capacity Development (June 1969) and Look-Ahead Plans for Crude
(June 1966))
Note that the above title from the document is based primarily on the
1966 and 1969 Plans, thus failing to take into account any later revisions.
Further, the title of this section refers to Production rather than to
Capacity as would be the appropriate measure. None of the fields' produc-
tion figures are dated in the document; thus there is no indication of when
the first and later increments of the fields come on stream. For this reason
the document's estimates cannot be counted as field capabilities in 1972/73.
Document Estimate Ultimate Probable
Production Maximum Capacity
(TBD) (MSC)
(TBD)
Kupal*
Kilur Karim
Binak*
Lab-e Safid*
Par-e Siah*
Ramin
Sarkan-Maleh Kuh
Chashmeh Khush
Ab-e Teymur
Mansuri*
Ramshir*
165
20
58
110-
12
75
20
125
50
50
20
705
*Producing in 1974
100
100 ?
55
110
5
50
110 ?
110
50
110 ?
50
850
First half 1974 q: 130 TBD
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The choice of 165 TBD for Kupal comes from the June, 1971 "tentative"
plans for 1975 capacity (error = 25%). Since that time, the 1973 forecast
gives tentative targets of 124 and 176 TBD for 1977 and 1978, respectively,
*but given the depth and difficult drilling conditions, it is a most optimistic
goal. The 1973 forecast places 1974 capacity at 20 TBD, and actual output was
21 TBD. A more realistic goal here may bel100 TBD (close to the 110 TBD
"preliminary" (±15%) target for 1976.
Kilur Karim is included in the 1973 forecast for 20 TBD capacity
in 1974. This was scheduled to rise exactly in step with capacity increments
in Kupal, but t has yet to commence production.
Binak is assigned a capacity target of 55 TBD in the 1973 plan; 1974
output was 56 TBD. Binak is quite deep at 11,600 feet and already needs in-
jection to maintain capacity.
Lab-e Safid was scheduled to rise to 110 TBD in 1976 from a 1974
expected capacity of 30 TBD. Actual output was 11 TBD.
Par-e Siah in the Central Area is being used to supply the refineries.
In 1974 it produced at 7 TBD, exactly equal to the planned capacity for that
year. The 1978 expectation (tentative) is for 5 TBD.
Ramin does not appear in the 1973 forecast to 1978 of developed field
capacity. In 1969 it was projected at 70 TBD for 1978; in 1970 and 1971 at
25 TBD for 1975, and in 1972 at 38 TBD for 1976. To assign it a capacity or
production capability of more than 50 TBD at this point when so little is
known about it seems entirely premature.
Sarkan-Maleh Kuh are carried at 27 TBD for 1976, with a "tentative"
ultimate capacity of 110 for 1977. Production has not yet begun.
- -102 -
Chashmeh Khush follows exactly the same pattern as Sarkan-Maleh Kuh
in the 1973 forecast. The optimistic figure of 125 TBD comes from the June,
1971 forecast for tentative 1975 capacity; these plans have since been
revised both as to size and timing.
Ab-e Teymur has also been pushed into the future in the 1973 develop-
ment plan, scheduled to reach only 50 TBD capacity by 1978, not in 1976 as
the 1971 plan had projected.
Mansuri is given an ultimate capacity of 110 TBD (tentative) for 1977
and 1978, but onlu commenced production at 5 TBD in 1974. The 50 TBD esti-
mate made in 1971 was for 1976 capacity, but the latest forecast has 1976
capacity at 42 TBD. Since 1974 capacity was planned to be 20 TBD, and 1974
output only 5 TBD, one might conclude that the 1974 capacity plans were not
fully carried out.
Ramshir's capacity is set at 50 TBD for 1976-1978 in the 1973 pro-
jection. 1974 capacity had been planned at 20 TBD, and actual output was
19 TBD.
Summary: Latest revisions included in the 1973 forecast suggest that
a total capacity of 850 TBD may be installed in the fields above near the
end of the decade. But this estimate was made in the fall of 1973 and may
be too optimistic. Most of the "big" fields (more than 100 TBD capacity)
have yet to prove their worth, and the figure of 850 TBD could easily be
reduced to half that amount.
A
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V. OTHER PROSPECTS MENTIONED IN THE BOOK, AS YET UNDEVELOPED, WHICH CAN BE
DEVELOPED: Danan, Kabud, Shadegan, Sulabedar, Susangerd, Sulkhari, Band-e
Karkheh, Sardarabad, Bushgan.
No doubt there exists a price at which any field "could" be developed.
The document fails to include the fields of Halush, Karun, Dorquain, Deh-
luran, and Garangan.
VI. GRAND TOTAL, ITEMS I - IV: 9060 TBD-
The figure above is given in the document as the probable production
(or capacity) or Iranian fields. It has been wrongly interpreted as repre-
senting current capacity.
Our revisions in the capacity estimates explained above give a grand
total of 7898 TBD. Because of the doubts expressed in Items III and IV
infra, Iranian ultimate capacity may rather be in the neighborhood of
7300 TBD.
6· ·
.I
i.
PROBABLE MAXIMU`M 1972/73
PRODUCTION OF IRrNIAN
CONSORTIUM FIELDS
(According to availble Consortium documents)
I. FIELDS WHOSE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED ALLOWIABLE 1ETE (R) fHAS
NOT BEEN APPROACIHED (see Look-ahead Plans, June 1964):
Pazanan (Asmari) I ,OOO b/d 4 f 1 ,t t t/i,
Bibi Hakimeh 650,000 b/d
Kharg (Khami) 175,000 b/d
1,000, 000 b/d
II. DECLINING CENTRAL FIELDS (see Capital
October 1972):
Haft Kel 38,000 b/d
Masjed-e Soleyman 15,000 b/d
Naft Safid 34,000 b/d
Lali 1,000 b/d
Actuals ca 550,000/72
Development, June 1971,
88,000 b/d'
III. MAJOR FIELDS, PRODUCING AT MAXIMUM PROJECTED CAPACITY (see
Capital Development, June 1971, October 1972)s
Agha Jari )1,045000 b/d
Gachsaran 940,000 b/d
Ahwaz (Asnari and " a
Bangestan) \ 1 \sis6/^
-
Ka ran j
Marun
Paris
Rag-e Safid
CO~ a01F/ !// Mw}§§vl tI-"
Qeb_ (spee ?64.< tena3, 
Dg3'di mehnt .-Ju e tl· .i 971 )
1,860,000 b/d "
680,000 b/d
325,000 b/d
.... a.
IV. ADMITTED AND PROBABLY VASTLY UNDERSTATED MINIMUM PRODUCTION
OF LESS ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE FIELDS (see above referenc-
es and Crude il Capacity reveloprmnt (June 1969) and Loolc-
ahead Plans for Crude (June 1966) ) 
Kupal 165,000 b/d (see p. 65, Item A,
Dveloment, June 19'
Kilur Karim 20,000 b/d
Binak 58,000 b/d
Lab-e Safid 110,000 b/d (see p. 66, Item A,
Dev., June 1971)
Par-e Siah 12,000 b/d
Ramin (formerly 75,000 b/d (see p. 65, Item B,
Molla Sani) Dev., June 1971)
Maleh Kuh (test 5,000 b/d
only)
Sarwan (test only) 15,000 b/d
Ab-e Teymur 50,000 b/d (see p. 66, Item D,
' Dev., June 1971)
Cheshmeh Khosh 125,000 b/d (see ibid, p 65, Itei
Mansuri 50,000 b/d (Ibid, p 66, Item F)
Ramshir (former- 20,000 b/d
ly Khalafabad)
.
-: _ -
71)
rnxE
705,000 b/d
V. OTHER PROSPECTS MENTIONED IN THE BOOK, AS YET UNDEVELOPED,
WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPEDs
Danan. Kabud, Shadegan, Sulabedar,Susangerd,Golkhari
Band-e Karkheh, Sardarabad Bushgan
VI. GRXND TOTAL, ITEMS I - IV: l$-b/d
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Appendix II
C.T. Rand's study on oil, specifically with regard' to Iran.
In the recent publication by C.T. Rand entitled Making Democracy Safe
for Oil (Little-Brown, 1975), the behavior of the Iranian consortium is dis-
cussed, with reference to many of the Capital' Plans and Look-Ahead Plans
which we have used. The author however, does not make use of the most re-
cent one of September, 1973 entitled Capital Development Plan and Program,
1974-1978. In almost all instances his inferences and conclusions appear to
be either misleading or patently inaccurate.
In Chapter 3 "On Industry Costs and Profits," Rand suggests that Asmari
wells can be drilled for $800,000 or less, and that Bangestan wells may
cost as much as $2 million. But what is of importance here is the drilling
cost, both in terms of new and replacement capacity, per barrel of capacity,
and this is not discussed. The author concludes that the consortium has not
wanted to bother with Bangestan reserves "although some of them are very great."1
But if drilling costs together with other costs of production facilities,
were attractive on a daily barrel basis, the consortium would clearly have
bothered. All reading of consortium documents points to the selection of
least-cost development of capacity per daily barrel.
For development expenses, Paris and Karanj are cited as having a "cost
of developing wells to produce oil" of about $14 per daily barrel, where-
as some new fields, and Ramin and Kupal cost as much as $50 to $100 per
daily barrel.2 Yet the figures for Paris and Karanj are wrong as far back
s - as 1965; the Look Ahead Plans for that year give dilling costs alone of
-7.8 for Karanj and 11.33 for Paris, with capital coefficients in Paris of
'Rand, p. 46. This is yet to be established.
Ibid., p. 47.
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L26 and about L21-22 for Karanj. Costs for the new fields are reported but
are out of date, since the latest forecast has not been used. Deep fields
such as Kupal have always had high costs, both for drilling and for other
facilities.
In the same chapter the author suggests that Iranian costs for produc-
tion facilities have ranged between $17 and $28 a barrel; this is clearly
wrong.
The author uses $200 as a total capital cost per daily barrel, which is
probably on the low side now. "In 1967 the consortium itself stated that it
did not consider it worthwhile developing a prospect which entailed total
costs greater than about $185 adaily barrel, or $70 a daily barrel exclu-
ding terminal and pump station costs."4 He cites as his source the February
1967 plan, yet a check of the cited page provides us only with the information
that at that time that- L25 per bd was the target cost minimization figure for
capacity development, nothing further:
"When viewed from the commonly stated cost of 25,t/B/D for capacity
development, excluding terminal costs, the average of 27.8 t/B/D for the
three year period seems high..."5
Having established a ballpark capital cost per barrel, Rand then continues,
"(o)f course the oil companies do not pay anything close to $200 a daily bar-
rel for all their capacity."6 The "replacement" and "upgrading" of existing
capacity, according to Rand, is only $100 a daily barrel, and this type of
expenditure could meet most capacity targets. It is of great importance to
attempt to separate the costs of offsetting decline from the costs of develop-
3 Ibid., p. 50. See Look-Ahead Plan (June, 1965) for facilities only range of
L8 to 31 per bd, and Capital Development Program(September, 1973), pp.82-83
for similar range of L57 to 96.
4Ibid., p. 53.
Look-Ahead Plans for Crude Capacity Development (February, 1967), p. 12.
6Rand, p. 55.
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ing net new capacity, but Rand's paragraph has muddled the water here. He
is particularly referring to a 1972 presumed ability to produce 5.8 mbd at
the beginning of the year and a goal of 6.5 mbd capacity at the end of that
year (yet these are not the figures cited in any.of the Plans dated 1970, 1971
or 1972). He maintains that the rise of 700 TBD could be achieved for $140
million but division again gives $200, not $100.
But further, capital investment for producing facilities in 1972
was actually -t43.3 million. Capacity that year was expanded by about
950 TBD, for a cpaital cost of about $109.per bd, yet Rand never cites the
actual figures.
The figures on "actual per-barrel investment and operating costs" for
Aramco and the Consortium7 for the years 1968-1973 have no source or indi-
cation of how they were constructed.
The whole approach is to show that there was an evil conspiracy to re-
strict output in the Consortium fields. The onl'y truth to this allegation
is found by the manner in which capacity targets were set: the "Average Pro-
grammed Quantity" or APQ method. Yet in Rand, Chapter 7, "Iran: the Consortium
Era",. we are told that in 1964, "of course" the largest fields of Marun Karanj
and Bibi Hakimeh lay idle.8 Yet this is not really surprising for Karanj
was discovered only in 1963 and Marun in 1964 while Bibi Hakimeh was being
tested and then connected to the Gachsaran-Kharg line. We are told that the
Consortium could have tripled output at that time "just be relying on eight
of the old and new fields in its inventory" but there is no serious consider-
ation of the costs or time involved? More offensively, however, Rand proceeds
to suggest that the Consortium fields had an ultimate maximum capacity of
10 mbd from fields discovered in the 1964-1973 period. This is highly doubt-
7Rand, pp. 55-56.
Ibid., p. 144.
9 Ibid., p. 144.
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ful since the new fields are not generally believed to be "endowed with
excellent potential."lO Of course, any analysis of potential involves both
endowment and cost, and Rand makes neither specific.
The fact that Marun was in 1973 producing about 1 mbd instead of
the ultimate of 1.7 mbd (Rand gives 1.8 on page 144, but this has been re-
vised downward), is not an indication of malicious restriction, but of ab-
sence of installed facilities of all kinds to support this rate. Through-
out the period of the 1960's to the present, Marun was very rapidly developed
along with other light oil fields, given the preferential light development
emphasis.
This is not to say, as Rand concludes, that the Consortium held back
heavy development. Both were growing rapidly, but light was emphasized.
Our preceding chapter's discussion shows how many plans and alternatives
were evaluated so as to select the discounted least-cost capacity develop-
ment plan. Nowhere can we find substantiating evidence that the Consortium
planned "to expand Marun faster than it had wanted to."ll
The question is always what constitutes worthwhile development prospects.
While 5-TBD well potentials sound large to Rand, they are indeed low by OSCO
standards, and therefore fields of this type are passed over in favor of more
productive prospects.l2 This has been the case with almost all the new fields,
where expectations are low, and MOL's and gathering systems will be costly.
The major exception to this view of new fields is, of course, Lab-e-Safid,
where recent well-productivity is about 22 TBD. But Rand persists in at-
taching productivities to wells in new fields of 10-15 TBD, fields which "could
,,13
easily produce one million barrels a day or more, but a safer estimate
10 Ibid.
Ibid., p. 149.
See Rand, p. 157.
1 3 Ibid., p. 296.
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is probably only 500-700 TBD.
Perhaps the most interesting and most unsatisfying inclusion in the
volume is Rand's Appendix 9.14 Here he attempts to give field and area
capital costs per barrel for all component activities, such as drilling,
lines, and pumps. None of the data are carefully identified; a check of
the Capital Plans cited does not confirm the costs of.the items he selects.
Well productivities are not carefully estimated, and those of new fields
have been revised in the later report. We have tried to reconstruct his
rig month series, but all we have is the later (1973) string-year series,
which does not translate to Rand's series. In short, after examining the
Capital Plans reports, we should not place much confidence in Rand's
capital coefficients.
4Rand, "Estimated Comparative Development Costs of Some Iranian Consortium
Fields in Recent Years (In Pounds Sterling Per Daily Barrel)," pp. 363-364.
